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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the impact of country-level attributes on the relationship between proprietary costs
of financial reporting and financial statement comparability. Given that managers use discretion in financial
reporting, proprietary costs of financial reporting and country-level attributes could play a role in shaping
managers’ financial reporting behavior, which, in turn, could have an impact on financial statement
comparability. For international study, I use four country-level latent factors, suggested by Isidro et al.
(2019), that categorize most country-level features that affect financial reporting practices. I find that the
negative relationship between proprietary costs and comparability is stronger in countries with relatively
poorer financial reporting environments. This result indicates that managers are more concerned about
proprietary costs and enjoy more discretion allowed by poorer financial reporting environments. Further, I
find that strong protection of investor rights and better developed capital markets are most effective in
restricting managers’ use of discretion in financial reporting. This study provides guidance for standard
setters in countries with poor financial reporting environments. Regulators should emphasize strong
protection of investor rights and further develop capital markets in order to enhance firms’ financial
reporting quality.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study investigates the impact of country-level attributes on the relationship between
proprietary costs of financial reporting and financial statement comparability. Countries differ in a variety
of ways which include differences in legal systems, regulatory enforcement, social and organizational
culture, and economic and social environments. Given that managers use discretion in financial reporting,
proprietary costs of financial reporting and country-level attributes could play a role in shaping their
financial reporting behavior, which, in turn, could have an impact on financial statement comparability. For
example, in countries with strong financial reporting environments, managers might have incentive to use
discretion in a way that decreases comparability in order to protect proprietary information from
competitors. In contrast, in countries with weak financial reporting environments, managers might want to
enhance comparability in order to attract investors or capital suppliers. Since country-level attributes are
associated with financial reporting environments, this study uses an international setting to examine the
extent to which managers’ use of discretion varies by country, due to the aforementioned country-level
attributes. Therefore, I examine (1) how proprietary costs affect comparability across countries, and (2)
which country-level attributes most influence managers’ financial reporting discretion.
Unlike other qualitative characteristics, such as faithful representation, relevance, or timeliness,
comparability increases an accounting information user’s ability to infer one firm’s performance or
fundamentals against its competitors’ by enabling better identification of similarities and differences (IASB
2010; FASB 2013). De Franco et al. (2011) argue that financial statement comparability measures the
similarity of accounting function for individual firm. Accounting function reflects how economic events
(i.e., Return) are reflected in accounting income (i.e., Earnings). Although financial reporting is controlled
and monitored by accounting standards and regulations, latitude in financial reporting choice still exists
within accounting standards. Discretion in financial reporting choices by managers includes estimates for
1

bad debt expenses, loan loss provisions, deferred tax asset valuation allowances, impairment losses, pension
expense, and warranty expenses. This discretion afforded to managers can significantly affect investors’
ability to compare operating performance across firms (Imhof et al. 2018). Financial statement
comparability can be negatively influenced by discretion used by managers, since the accounting function
would be different after discretion is added. For example, if managers in competitive industries have
incentives to use more discretion into financial statements, a financial statement comparability is more
likely to be reduced.
Managers consider the proprietary costs of financial reporting during disclosure. According to
proprietary costs theory, as managers in competitive industries judge that the cost of disclosing proprietary
information outweighs the benefit, they withhold the information by using their discretion (Verrecchia
1983). Likewise, these managers may decide the extent to which they use discretion, after considering the
proprietary costs and benefits of comparability. In fact, comparable financial statements can lower the cost
of capital (Imhof et al. 2017). On the other hand, comparable financial reporting can reveal proprietary
information to peers, increasing threats to firms from competitors (Young and Zeng 2015; Choi et al. 2019).
Collectively, proprietary costs theory predicts a competitive industry would affect financial statement
comparability. Also, the main finding of Imhof et al. (2018) that competition incentivizes managers to use
financial reporting discretion in a way that reduces financial statement comparability supports this theory.
In this study, using a sample that includes firms from 47 countries, I investigate whether the effect
of proprietary costs on comparability varies across countries based on financial reporting environment. The
moderating impact of international differences on the relationship between proprietary costs and financial
statement comparability is not obvious ex ante. Previous literature has focused on the effect of proprietary
costs and on the only part of international factors. By using a comprehensive set of country-level attributes,
I can observe the moderating effect of most of international differences. For example, in countries with
poor financial reporting environments, management is less likely to be monitored or disciplined, and
2

investors are not well-protected. Thus, managers are more likely to have incentive to use discretion to report
larger earnings than competitors’, reducing comparability much more. However, in countries with strong
financial reporting environments, financial statement information is already used as an important
investment decision tool (Ball et al. 2000). Since managers’ financial reporting practices are well monitored
or disciplined, managers are less likely to have incentive to use discretion, reducing financial statement
comparability lesser. Imhof et al. (2017) suggest that a higher level of comparability mitigates investors’
information risks and, thus, lowers their required rates of return. Although investor protections in a strong
financial reporting environment are valued by investors, comparable financial reporting can also lower
information-processing costs and increase revelation of proprietary information to competitors. In this case,
financial statement comparability could be attenuated by managers. Hence, I expect the effects of
proprietary costs on comparability to vary across countries with different financial reporting environments.
Little research exists on how the relationship between proprietary costs and financial statement
comparability varies across country-specific financial reporting environments. The majority of prior
international accounting studies regarding the determinants of comparability have focused on the role of
accounting standards (e.g. IFRS, US GAAP, and local GAAP) and have ignored unique country-level legal,
cultural, and societal factors (Barth et al., 2013; Lang et al., 2010). Barth et al. (2013) suggests that the
adoption of global accounting standards is necessary but not sufficient to explain accounting comparability.
This motivates the study of how country-level attributes affect the relationship between proprietary costs
and financial statement comparability. This study sheds light on how country-level financial reporting
environments play a role in shaping firms’ financial statement comparability. I propose that the role of
proprietary costs in determining financial reporting choice depends on various aspects of each country’s
financial reporting environment, such as legal and governance systems, protection of investors’ rights,
political transparency, culture and social factors, and openness of society to external investors.
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The international accounting and finance literature has provided a multitude of country-level
attributes with cross-country variation in financial reporting quality, which include geographic features,
legal institutions, religious affiliation, cultural development and even economic factors. However, the fact
that most country-level factors are correlated with each other presents a challenge to empirical research
(Isidro et al. 2019). Thus, Isidro et al. (2019) construct four principal component factors that categorize
most country-level features which affect financial reporting practices. I use these four country-level latent
factors. Factor one (Corporate Environment) is comprised of a mix of measures related to a country’s legal
and governance systems, economic welfare, legal rights, and social attributes representing more informal
institutions. Factor two (Investor Protection) captures variables such as creditor and investor rights,
securities regulation, capital market size, and legal origin. Further, factor three (Governance Environment)
includes the number of analysts, domestic institutional holdings, and firm structure such as hierarchy and
independence that can play a role in governance. Finally, factor four (External Investors) captures the
openness of society particularly in relation to external investors. This factor is characterized by US
institutional holdings, US cross-listing, audit spending, English proficiency, long-term orientation, and
Buddhism. A score less than (greater than) the median in each factor group indicates a poor (strong)
financial reporting environment.
I document two important findings in this paper. First, I find that the negative relationship between
proprietary costs and comparability is stronger in countries with poor financial reporting environments,
because an outcome of t-test between coefficients of proxies for proprietary costs in countries with poor
FRE and in those with strong FRE is significantly negative. In countries with less developed financial
reporting environments, managers are less likely to be monitored and disciplined in their financial reporting
behavior. Despite arguments that managers could provide comparable financial statements to attract
investors or to finance capital, the results in this study support the view that managers use more discretion
to make financial statements less comparable. These results indicate that managers are more concerned
4

about proprietary costs and enjoy the increased discretion allowed by poor financial reporting environments.
Secondly, I find that, among the country-level attributes, Investor Protection has the largest impact on the
relationship between proprietary costs and comparability. The Investor Protection variable is associated
with stronger protections of investor rights and more developed capital markets. Therefore, this study
provides evidence that strong protection of investor rights and better developed capital markets are effective
in restricting managers’ use of discretion in financial reporting.
This international study contributes to existing literature in two ways. First, it extends the findings
conducted by Imhof et al. (2018) on U.S. firms to an international setting. This highlights the differential
effects played by proprietary costs of financial reporting on accounting comparability across countries with
different financial reporting environments. The negative relationship between proprietary costs and
comparabilty in the U.S. may not apply to other countries due to differences in financial reporting
environments. The United States has a unique financial reporting environment that may affect the
generalizability of the relationship (Leuz et al. 2003). Specifically, in countries with poor financial reporting
environments, managers may reduce comparability in competitive industries, because poorer financial
reporting environments do not discipline financial reporting quality. In contrast, managers may use less
discretion and enhance comparability in order to attract investors, who are unwilling to rely on opaque
financial information. Hence, the results might be useful for stakeholders, particularly investors, in
analyzing firms’ financial statements, especially in countries with poor financial reporting environments.
Secondly, this international study demonstrates the differing impact of various country-level
attributes on the relationship between proprietary costs and comparability. Instead of using a comprehensive
set of 72 country-level attributes, I use four latent factors (Corporate Environment, Investor Protection,
Governance Environment, External Investors) proposed by Isidro et al. (2019) in order to effectively
investigate the effect of these country-level attributes on the relationship. Specifically, since the differential
impact of each of the four factors is not observable in a within-country study, I use an international setting
5

to test how variation in the four factors across countries affect the relationship between proprietary costs of
financial reporting and financial statement comparability. Among these four factors, Investor Protection
has the highest impact on the negative relationship, suggesting that strong protection of investor rights and
developed capital markets restrict managers’ incentives to use discretion in financial reporting. This study
also contains some policy implications for standard setters in countries with poor financial reporting
environment, as they should first emphasize the strong protection of investor rights, and attempt to develop
capital markets to enhance firms’ financial reporting quality.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
According to proprietary costs theory (Verrechia 1983), managers’ financial reporting discretion
afforded by accounting standards could negatively affect comparability in competitive industries. Managers
consider benefits and costs of comparable financial statements in financial disclosure. Comparable financial
statements can decrease information asymmetry, lowering cost of capital (Imhof et al. 2017). On the other
hand, comparable financial reporting can be exploited by peer firms, and thus increase threats to firms from
competitors (Young and Zeng 2015; Choi et al. 2019). This leads to costly proprietary information
disclosure, since managers in competitive environments are more likely to think of comparable financial
reporting as costly. Thus, I expect a negative relationship between proprietary costs of financial reporting
and financial statement comparability. In addition, the financial reporting environment affects managers’
use of financial reporting discretion, in terms of informal institutions, investor protection, corporate
governance, and openness to external investors. An international setting enables me to investigate whether
the negative relation found in countries with strong financial reporting environments applies to other
countries, especially in those with poor financial reporting environments. In the setting, I first examine a
comparability within industry for each country and do cross-country study by comparing this comparability
of each country. Also, I measure proprietary costs of each industry in two ways. Thus, I can test how each
country’s factors differentiate the relation between proprietary costs and comparability. By using four latent
factors provided by Isidro et al. (2019), I examine the impact of the country-level attributes on the
relationship between proprietary costs and financial statement comparability.
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2.1. The Effects of Financial Reporting Environments
Financial statement comparability can improve informativeness in that it enables comparison of
financial statements across firms. This comparison helps competitors to interpret proprietary information
and evaluate investment opportunities. The importance of comparability of financial statements is
underscored in the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) accounting concepts statements.
Specifically, FASB (1980) states that “investing and lending decisions essentially involve evaluations of
alternative opportunities, and they cannot be made rationally if comparative information is not available”.
Also, according to the FASB, one of the most important roles of accounting standards is to facilitate
comparability between firms (FASB 2010). According to the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB 2010), comparability is a qualitative characteristic that enables users to identify and understand
similarities in, and differences among, items. Both the FASB and IASB emphasize that comparability
enhances the usefulness of financial information for decision makers (IASB 2010; FASB 2013). Many
studies have documented various benefits of comparability. For example, a higher level of comparability
improves analyst forecast accuracy and reduces information asymmetry (De Franco et al. 2011), thereby
improving information processing capabilities (Kim et al. 2013). Reduced information asymmetry resulting
from higher comparability produces other benefits as well, such as a lower cost of capital (Shane et al.
2014), efficient capital allocation (Barth 2013; Chen et al. 2014), availability of more firm-specific
information (Choi et al. 2019), and higher firm value (Neel 2017).
On the other hand, comparable financial statements can also impose costs on managers. When
competitors are able to compare operating performance across firms, it is easier to find proprietary
information concealed in financial statements. Comparable financial statements allow competitors to better
evaluate their competitive advantage or disadvantage (Young and Zeng 2015). Moreover, comparable
financial statements facilitate inferences regarding future earnings (Choi et al. 2019). When an economic
event occurs, firms can more accurately expect future earnings by analyzing peers’ earnings after similar
8

economic events. Therefore, in competitive industries, managers use discretion to reduce the comparability
of financial statements, because of the increased proprietary costs of financial reporting. In other words,
less comparable financial statements can protect a firm’s competitive advantage from competitors.
The proprietary costs theory argues that, as managers in competitive industries judge that the cost
of disclosing proprietary information outweighs the benefit of it, they will use their discretion (Verrecchia
1983). Likewise, as proprietary costs of financial reporting outweigh the benefits of comparability,
managers are more likely to use discretion to decrease comparability. Verrecchia (1983) argues that
managers in highly competitive industries prefer less informative disclosures to conceal proprietary
information, leading to an opaque information environment in order to reduce threats from rivals. Harris
(1998) reports a lower likelihood of separate segment disclosures when competition is high. Verrecchia and
Weber (2006) suggest that competitive pressures compel managers to withhold proprietary information
because disclosure can result in loss of market share. Ali et al. (2014) argue that low quality disclosure by
firms in concentrated industries can be attributed to the proprietary costs of financial reporting in industries
facing stiff competition. These prior findings show that managers weigh the risk of disclosing proprietary
information through financial reporting in a competitive environment. Hence, as compeition increases in
intensity, managers’ financial reporting may differ, depending on proprietary costs of financial reporting
and benefits of comparability.
Although Imhof et al. (2018) find a negative association between the proprietary costs of financial
reporting and financial statement comparability in the U.S, there is a need for further investigation of the
relationship between proprietary costs and comparability outside the U.S. The United States has a unique
financial reporting environment with large stock markets, dispersed ownership, strong investor rights, and
strong legal enforcement (Leuz et al. 2003). Prior research documents that country-level attributes affect
the financial reporting environment and managers’ financial reporting behavior. For example, code law
accounting income is less timely, particularly in incorporating economic losses (Ball et al. 2000). Leuz et
9

al. (2003) find that earnings management decreases in countries with strong legal protections, such as high
quality of minority shareholder rights and legal enforcement. Behn et al. (2013) provide evidence that
classification shifting is more common in weak investor protection countries. Haw et al. (2015) find
evidence that product market competition is positively associated with accounting conservatism in countries
with strong legal institutions, but not in countries with weak legal institutions. As country-level attributes
affect financial reporting environment, I can expect that these attributes may also influence managers’
incentives to use discretion in financial reporting practice.
In countries with strong financial reporting environments, strong and well-enforced investor
protection mitigates insiders’ incentives to obfuscate accounting information because outsiders will likely
take disciplinary actions against them (Leuz et al. 2003). According to the proprietary costs theory
(Verrechia 1983), managers in competitive industries might conceal proprietary information to protect their
competitive advantage. For instance, competitors use disclosing firms’ financial reporting as a benchmark
to evaluate their relative status and performance. Thus, managers might have incentives to use discretion to
hamper competitors from setting up threatening business strategy. This is because when financial
statements are comparable, comparability enhances the usefulness of financial information for decision
makers (FASB, 2013). Further, comparability can help directors make hiring/firing and compensation
decisions by facilitating the evaluation of managers relative to their industry peers. Investors benefit from
comparability by being better able to distinguish between alternative investment opportunities (Imhof et al.
2018). Therefore, in these countries, managers may have less incentive to use discretion in financial
reporting because they are well monitored and disciplined to protect external investors and because they
need to attract external investors for capital needs, who normally do not rely on opaque accounting
information. However, since financial reporting environments in these countries already mitigated
information asymmetry and secured investor protection, industry peers or external investors tend to depend
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on accounting information much. In these countries, managers may have more incentive to use discretion
in financial reporting in a way that reduces comparability.
On the other hand, in countries with poor financial reporting environment, since managers are less
monitored, accounting information in these countries has less transparency, lower disclosure, and lower
quality (Bushman et al. 2004; DeFond et al. 2007; Haw et al. 2012). For example, Ball et al. (2000) suggest
that code-law countries give greater discretion to managers in deciding when economic gains and losses
are incorporated in accounting income. In these regimes, since investors are not well-protected and face
greater information asymmetry, they might require higher cost of capital and more transparent accounting
information. In other words, when the benefits of comparable financial reporting outweigh the proprietary
costs of financial reporting, managers may have less incentive to use discretion. In turn, financial statement
comparability, which is a qualitative aspect of the financial reporting environment, could be expected to
increase. However, since poor financial reporting environment generally cannot limit this incentive,
managers may have incentives to use more discretion to compete with industry peers to show higher
performance to investors. Also, in competitive environment, proprietary costs of financial reporting tend to
be costly, managers can have incentive to use more discretion in a way that reduces comparability.
Given the possible relationship between proprietary costs and comparability, I first test whether
financial reporting environments affect the relationship between proprietary costs of financial reporting and
finanacial statement comparability. Since strong financial reporting environments already protect investors
and reduce information asymmetry, I expect that proprietary costs of financial reporting outweigh the
benefits of comparability under strong financial reporting environments (negative relationship). I also test
whether this negative relationship applies to countries outside the U.S., especially where there are poor
financial reporting environments. Contrary to strong financial reporting regimes such as the U.S., countries
with poor financial reporting environment may encourage different managers’ financial reporting behaviors.
For example, since management is less likely to be monitored, meaning that investors are not well-protected,
11

managers in countries with poor financial reporting environments are more likely to enhance comparability
to attract external investors by showing better financing conditions, such as a lower cost of capital.
Meanwhile, managers might be able to use more discretion to conceal proprietary information, because
poor financial reporting environment allows more leeway in financial reporting practice. Collectively, I
predict that managers in countries with poor financial reporting environment and those in countries with
strong financial reporting environment may act differently in their financial reporting practice. This
argument leads to my first testable hypothesis (Figure 1):
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The negative relationship between proprietary costs of financial reporting and
financial statement comparability is stronger in countries with poor financial reporting environments.

2.2. The Impact of Country-level Attributes of Financial Reporting Environments
While previous hypothesis predicts effect of financial reporting environments on relationship
between proprietary costs and comparability, some studies reveal that many factors are contained in
financial reporting environments. Among these factors, I focus on country-level attributes in this study,
which shape the managers’ incentive to use discretion in financial reporting. Prior literature has linked these
country-level attributes to the financial reporting practice, such as differences in regulation enforcement,
legal systems, social factor, and cultural factor. For example, Leuz et al. (2003) argue that earnings quality
is positively related to the quality of minority shareholder rights and legal enforcement, since when investor
protection is strong, insiders enjoy fewer private control benefits and consequently fewer incentives to mask
firm performance. Doupnik and Tsakumis (2004) suggest that Gray’s (1998) model links Hofstede’s (1980)
societal values to a system of accounting values leading to accounting outcomes. They argue that societal
values influence managers’ accounting techniques. Han et al. (2010) document that both national culture
and institutional structure are important factors that explain corporate managers’ earnings discretion
12

practices around the world. They provide evidence that individualism (uncertainty avoidance) is positively
(negatively) related to the magnitude of earnings discretion.
Based on the previous findings, I delve into the effects of a country’s financial reporting
environment on the relationship between proprietary costs of financial reporting and financial statement
comparability. An investigation of variations in financial reporting environments between countries
requires scrutiny of features specific to each country, since these country-specific features, which form the
financial reporting environment, influence financial reporting practices differently. Managers may consider
proprietary costs of financial reporting and country-level attributes that belong to financial reporting
environments when they disclose financial information. If they put more weight on their capital needs, the
benefit of comparability could be relatively high. However, they aim to outperform their industry peers,
then they may have incentives to use as much discretion as possible. Therefore, varying financial reporting
environments could influence financial statement comparability. This leads to my second hypothesis, stated
in the null form (Figure 1):
Hypothesis 2. (H2): Country-level differences do not affect the relation between proprietary costs and
comparability.
According to previous international accounting studies, determinants of country-level financial
reporting environments include geographic features (e.g. country latitude), legal institutions (e.g. legal
origin), religious affiliation (e.g. percentage Catholic, religiosity), cultural development (e.g. masculinity,
societal trust) and economic outcomes (e.g. per capita GDP, market capitalization, stock market
participation). Therefore, my empirical research considers these country-level factors. The main challenge
for empirical tests examining the impact of country-level attributes, however, is the long list of countrylevel factors. Isidro et al. (2019) describe a way to efficiently and accurately overcome these challenges.
They investigate a comprehensive set of 72 country-level variables proposed in extant literature to explain
international variation in economic outcomes. They find most country-level factors are correlated which
13

presents a challenge to empirical research. Thus, they construct four principal component factors to
categorize most of the country-level features that affect financial reporting practices. They find that these
four factors collectively explain over 70% of the cross-country variation in financial reporting practices.
Therefore, I use the four factors (Corporate Environment, Investor Protection, Governance Environment,
External Investors) as country-level attributes to test my second hypothesis.
Specifically, Corporate Environment (Isidro et al. (2019)’s factor one) mainly captures informal
institutions, such as cultural values and norms that affect human behavior (Crossland and Hambrick 2011).
Managers’ financial reporting practices include a certain amount of their discretion, which is derived from
the external environment (Finkelstein et al. 2009). Finkelstein et al. (2009) suggest that a manager might
have multiple possible courses of action in a given situation, and the manager’s discretion is in part a
function of his or her own cognitive limit. This cognitive limit is influenced by the external environment.
The external environment is divided into formal institutions and informal institutions (North 1990). Formal
institutions are explicit rules, structures and outcomes in society, such as legal systems and regulatory
conditions. Prior international accounting research has shown that a country’s formal institutions affect
financial reporting quality. On the other hand, informal institutions are largely uncodified systems of
meaning present in customs, values, and unwritten codes of conduct (Deephouse et al. 2016). In this study,
Corporate Environment captures informal institutions, which influence formal institutions (Helmke and
Leevitsky 2004). Even if formal institutions are not well developed, informal institutions substitute for
formal institutions (North 1990). Previous researchers suggest that country-level informal institutions elicit
shared cognitive and normative frameworks among economic agents (Abdi and Aulakh 2012).
Managers’ incentives to use discretion in financial reporting is affected by the values, norms, and
beliefs, which are associated with informal instititutions. Culture defines what is legitimate, right and
desirable in a given society (Deephouse et al. 2016). Therefore, it influence managers’ financial reporting
behavior regarding amount of discretion (Han et al. 2010). Corruption is also included in informal
14

institutions, as it is rooted in societal beliefs and norms (Judge et al. 2008), and thus might affect managers’
financial reporting behavior. Managers use judgment in financial reporting for desired accounting numbers
(Han et al. 2010). Thus, managers in a regime where individualism (uncertainty avoidance) is prevalent,
are more (less) likely to use earnings discretion. Malagueno et al. (2010) find evidence that accounting
quality is significantly negatively related to the level of perceived corruption in a country. Thus, in countries
where informal institutions are well-developed, social norms and beliefs may not tolerate managers’
incentives to exercise a large amount of discretion. In other words, in countries where Corporate
Environment is poor, managers’ discretion in financial reporting can be viewed as legitimate. As
proprietary cost of financial reporting are high, managers are more likely to have higher incentives to use
discretion to hide proprietary information or to mask their performance, resulting in less comparable
financial statements. However, if countries have strong informal institutions, social norms and beliefs may
reduce managers’ incentives to use discretion relatively. Therefore, I predict that the negative relationship
between proprietary costs and comparability is stronger in countries with poor Corporate Environment,
because in these countries managers enjoy greater private control benefits and hence have stronger
incentives to use discretion in financial reporting. This leads to one of the subsets of the second hypothesis,
which is the following (Figure 1):
Hypothesis 2.a. (H2a): The negative association between proprietary costs of financial reporting and
financial statement comparability is more pronounced in countries with poor Corporate Environment.
Investor Protection (Isidro et al. (2019)’s factor two) mainly captures the type of legal system, the
strength of regulation enforcement, and self-dealing controls exist normally for investor protection.
Managers have incentives to conceal their private control benefits from outsiders because, if these benefits
are detected, outsiders will likely take disciplinary actions against them (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
Accordingly, managers have incentives to use discretion in order to mask firm performance and to conceal
costly proprietary information in competitive industries. In turn, managers may reduce financial statement
15

comparability by using financial reporting discretion. Further, legal systems protect investors by conferring
on them the rights to discipline insiders (e.g., to replace managers), as well as to limit managers’ private
control benefits (La Porta et al. 1998). Thus, legal systems effectively control managers’ incentives to use
discretion in competitive industries. For example, Ball et al. (2000) suggest that code-law accounting
standards give greater discretion to managers in deciding when economic gains and losses are incorporated
in accounting income. Leuz et al. (2003) find increasing earnings management as countries move from
economies with large stock markets, strong investor rights and stronger legal enforcement policies to
economies with weaker legal enforcement. Therefore, I predict that the negative relationship between
proprietary costs and comparability is stronger in countries with poor Investor Protection, because in these
countries managers enjoy greater private control benefits and hence have stronger incentives to use
discretion in financial reporting. This leads to another subset of the second hypothesis, which is the
following (Figure 1):
Hypothesis 2.b. (H2b): The negative association between proprietary costs of financial reporting and
financial statement comparability is more pronounced in countries with poor Investor Protection.
Governance Environment (Isidro et al. (2019)’s factor three) in this empirical test is mainly related
to the number of analysts, domestic institutional holdings, and firm structure such as hierarchy and
independence that can play a role in governance. Corporate governance is typically defined as the set of
mechanisms designed to mitigate agency problems that arise between shareholders and managers because
of the separation of ownership and control (Jensen 1993). Information asymmetry between these parties is
the main reason of agency problems, implying that a firm’s information environment is a crucial input that
affects the design of its corporate governance mechanisms that are implemented to monitor managers. In
competitive industries, managers have incentives to hide proprietary information from peers or investors in
order to protect their competitive advantages. In addition, they attempt to mask their poor performance to
meet market expectations, which give harsh punishments in competitive environments when they
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underperform (Karuna 2007). In competitive industries, a strong governance environment can mitigate
managers’ incentives to use financial reporting discretion, and improves financial reporting quality. For
example, several financial reporting frauds such as Enron and Worldcom resulted from governance
problems. Previous research finds a positive association between weaker governance environment and poor
financial reporting quality, increased earnings manipulation, and financial statement fraud (Dechow et al.
1996; Beasley 1996; Krishnan 2001). Given the effect of poor corporate governance on managerial
discretion and financial reporting practices, there has been an emphasis on the need to improve corporate
governance over the financial reporting practice. Degeorge et al. (2013) document that financial analysts
play a monitoring role, resulting in less earnings management. In countries with strong governance
environment, managers may use less discretion and thus enhance financial statement comparability,
because in these countries managers are more likely to have their financial reporting practices monitored.
Therefore, I predict that the negative relationship between proprietary costs and comparability is stronger
in countries with weak Governance Environment. This leads to the third subset of the second hypothesis,
which is the following (Figure 1):
Hypothesis 2.c. (H2c): The negative association between proprietary costs of financial reporting and
financial statement comparability is more pronounced in countries with poor Governance Environment.
Lastly, External Investors (Isidro et al. (2019)’s factor four) mainly represents openness of society
to external investment. External investors rely heavily on accounting information, and thus require high
quality of accounting information, in order to remove barriers for investment. This is because information
asymmetry and agency problems may hinder external investors from interpreting accounting information.
Consequently, external investors will rely more on financial reports when accounting information is
transparent, and when other sources of information are lacking (Bagnoli and Watts 2010). Accounting
information helps managers to communicate information to external investors. More precise and transparent
accounting information may mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems. The purpose of
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financial statements is to provide useful information for investment decisions (IASC 2001). For example,
Brennan and Cao (1997) suggest that foreign investors are less informed than locals and thus react more
slowly to market developments. This information asymmetry between foreign and domestic investors can
lead to lower foreign investments because of the foreign investor’s disadvantage. Meanwhile, Stulz and
Williamson (2003) suggest that the openness serves as a proxy for the benefits from letting markets work
unimpeded. They also document a positive relationship between openness and investor rights. In
competitive industries, managers have incentives to hide proprietary information from peers in order to
protect their competitive advantages. Moreover, they attempt to use discretion to bring positive reactions
from external investors. But this may fail, since external investors request high quality of accounting
information and high degree of financial transparency, constraining managers’ incentives to use discretion
in financial reporting. Therefore, I predict that the negative relationship between proprietary costs and
comparability is stronger in countries with less External Investors. This leads to the fourth subset of the
second hypothesis, which is the following (Figure 1):
Hypothesis 2.d. (H2d): The negative association between proprietary costs of financial reporting and
financial statement comparability is more pronounced in countries with less External Investors.
In sum, each of the four country-level attributes likely affects the relationship between proprietary
costs and comparability, respectively. As each factor has a lower score, the financial reporting environment
is poor. Poor financial reporting environment allows managers to exercise more discretion in financial
reporting practice, and in competitive industries managers attempt to use more discretion to hide proprietary
information from competitors, reducing financial statement comparability. Although, managers might have
less incentive use discretion to enhance comparability when they want to attract investors for capital needs,
poor financial reporting environments allow more discretion to outperform competitors. Meanwhile,
although strong financial reporting environments tend to constrain managers’ incentive to use discretion in
financial reporting, this effect could not be great, because strong financial reporting environments already
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protect investors and reduce information asymmetry. Consequently, managers normally consider these
proprietary costs of financial reporting, country-level attributes, and benefits of comparability in financial
disclosure. Therefore, I expect that the negative relationship between proprietary cost and comparability is
stronger in countries with poorer financial reporting environment with a low score for each factor.

Figure 1. Hypotheses Development.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1. Sample Selection
My sample consists of all listed companies for the period from 2000 to 2018. The sample consists
of data from 47 countries. The sample is obtained from the COMPUSTAT Global, CRSP, and I/B/E/S
databases. Following previous research, Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded from the initial
sample. Accounting income and other financial data are from the COMPUSTAT Global files. Stock price
data are drawn from the CRSP. I exclude firm-year observations with missing values to compute dependent
and independent variables. I keep only those observations in countries with country-level attributes
measures for the 47 countries proposed by Isidro et al. (2019). To mitigate the influence of outliers, I
winsorize each firm-level variable at the 1st and 99th percentile values. The final sample contains 78,937
firm-year observations.

3.2. Main Variables
3.2.1. Measures of Proprietary Costs of Financial Reporting
One of the challenging tasks in my empirical study is to find proper proxies for proprietary costs
of financial reporting. In fact, proprietary costs mainly result either from the competitive environment or
from firm-specific advantages. Firm-specific advantages normally include new technologies, better
operations, and even a larger firm size. The crucial problem of using proxies associated with firm-specific
advantages is that the firms with these advantages have less comparable financial statement with peers’
financial statements, because firm-specific features themselves can bring about real differences in business
structure, and financial reporting as well. Imhof et al. (2018) use Competitive Strategy, grouped as
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Defender and Prospector, which is closely associated with comparability. In other words, Prospector and
Defender have different business structures and thus different financial reporting practices as well,
regardless of the managers’ discretion over financial reporting. While, as competitive environment
intensifies, the need to protect proprietary information from competitors increases (Imhof et al. 2018).
Therefore, I find other proxies that are not closely associated with financial statement comparability – The
Speed of Positive Abnormal Profit Adjustment and Industry Follower.1
The Speed of Positive Abnormal Profit Adjustment
Many theoretical researchers have studied managers' incentives to disclose information to outside
parties. Verrecchia (1983) allows for the existence of proprietary costs of disclosure in his model of
discretionary disclosure and arrives at an equilibrium, in which some firms do not disclose all value-relevant
information. Specifically, he shows that capital market participants will provide firms that have higher
proprietary costs of disclosure more discretion in their disclosure practices and that these firms
consequently disclose less than firms with lower proprietary costs of disclosure. Proprietary costs are higher
when disclosed information is more useful to the firm's product market rivals. It is also higher when these
rivals can take greater advantage of the information at the expense of the disclosing firm. Verrecchia (1990)
and Clinch and Verrecchia (1997) argue that there is less disclosure in industries more intense competition
among incumbents exists, because proprietary costs of disclosure are greater in such industries. In these
industries, a disclosing firm's rivals are likely to take more aggressive actions in response to the disclosures.
Given that rivals acquire proprietary information on industry demand through peers’ disclosures and revise

1

To address endogenous issue, I first consider a Heckman two-stage model instead of developing my proxies in this
study. However, a Heckman two-stage model is only appropriate in unique setting (Bascle 2008). For example,
Wolfolds and Siegel (2019) illustrate that Heckman model often provides less reliable outcomes than OLS model,
without the assumptions being met. Next, I attempt to use instrumental variable (IV) methods, which are commonly
used in accounting research. However, there are challenges that limit the use of IV methods. For instance, Larcker and
Rusticus (2010) identify conditions under which IV methods are preferred to OLS estimates. Therefore, in order to
use the IV methods, several fundamental requirements must be met. Since this study has difficulties in using the above
methods to address endogeneity, I rather develop my proxies for more reliable results.
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their strategies to the detriment of the disclosing firm, the abnormal positive profits from this demand will
disappear more quickly for firms in more competitive industries.
In this study, to meaure proprietary costs of financial reporting, I use Harris’ (1998) speed of profit
adjustment metric to measure the competitive environment. It captures the speed with which those industry
participants with above-average profits have their positive abnormal profitability revert to the industry mean.
For example, Harris (1998) argues that firms disclose less information about their operation in less
competitive environment to protect the abnormal profits of these operations. Also, Harris (1998) notes that
this measure provides an indicator of the persistence of abnormal profits away from the industry mean. The
proxy for speed of adjustment, ADJ_SPEED, calculated separately for each industry j. As with industry
concentration variables, a higher value of ADJ_SPEED implies less competition and less proprietary costs.
I estimate Harris’ (1998) measure of the speed of positive abnormal profit adjustment with the following
regression:
X 𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑘 (𝐷𝑛 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 ) + 𝜷𝟐𝒋𝒌 (𝐷𝑝 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 ) + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡
, where X 𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = the difference between firm i’s return on assets and the mean return on assets for its industry
j and country k, in year t;
𝐷𝑛 = 1 if 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 is less than or equal to 0, and 0 otherwise; and
𝐷𝑝 = 1 if 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise.
The equation above is estimated separately for each three-digit SIC code industry using pooled
cross-sectional time-series data for all firms in each industry and country. The coefficient 𝜷𝟐𝒋𝒌 reflects the
persistence of return on assets above the mean in industry j and in country k. A significant positive
coefficient indicates that firms with above average profit rates are able to maintain this profit advantage
over time, suggesting less competition. The speed of profit adjustment reflects competition for abnormal
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profits over time. Note that this measure is capable of capturing competition among a few large firms in a
concentrated industry while the concentration ratios are not. Therefore, higher ADJ_SPEED is related to
higher proprietary costs.
Industry Follower (Market Share)
Many empirical studies have explored inter-industry differences in financial reporting behavior.
However, firms within the same industry are likely to face different levels of competition depending on
their market position. Studies have used several firm-specific proxies of proprietary costs, such as market
share. The intensity of competition can be perceived differently by industry leader and follower, which are
categorized by market share. Thus, the effects of competition on managers’ financial reporting behavior are
different for industry leaders and followers. Nickell (1996) documents that industry followers face greater
competitive pressures than industry leaders. Moreover, industry followers also face greater competitive
pressures because of predation risk. Therefore, industry leaders, compared to industry followers, are less
vulnerable to the threats posed by competitive pressure. Li (2010) suggests that the effect of competitive
pressure on disclosure quality is less pronounced for industry leader. This paper documents that the effect
of competitive pressure in reducing profit forecast optimism and investment forecast pessimism is stronger
for industry followers. Dhaliwal et al. (2014) also suggest that industry followers recognize bad news earlier
than good news, as industry followers face greater competitive pressures. As with the above previous
empirical research findings, market share is likely able to proxy for proprietary costs of financial reporting.
Proprietary costs of disclosure can be low for firms with high market share within the industry.
Market share, defined as company sales divided by the sales for all firms in the industry, measures
percentage of industry sales controlled by the firm. High market share indicates a position of market power,
which refers to the ability of the firm to take unilateral action in its product market without serious
competitive consequences (Landes and Posner 1981). Some studies suggest that high-market-power firms
(Leader) may have lower disclosure costs because their price-setting ability allows them to pass demand
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shocks on to customers by changing prices (Peress 2010). Wagenhofer (1990) argues that market power
insulates Leader from competitors’ counteractions. Further, firms with high market share want to highlight
their strong margins to investors by disclosing sales forecasts to accompany their earnings forecasts (Acito
et al. 2019). Consequently, the threshold level of disclosure can be low for firms with high market share,
leading to more frequent disclosures and disclosures with a weaker good news bias. In my empirical
analysis, firms within the same industry are sorted into quartiles according to their market shares, and those
in the top quartile are identified as Leader, otherwise Follower. Follower is associated with costly
proprietary information.

3.2.2. Financial Statement Comparability Measure
I employ an earnings-based measure of financial statement comparability suggested by De Franco
et al. (2011), which considers accounting systems to be a mapping of information from economic events
into financial statements. Earlier papers on accounting comparability were based on the comparability of
financial reporting inputs (input-based approach), such as the accounting rules and the choice of reporting
methods. Most of these studies derive comparability by counting and weighing differences in accounting
method choices over time or across firms. However, recent research has mostly focused on the
comparability of the outputs of the financial reporting process (output-based approach), most notably of
earnings. For example, one of the most widely used output-based measures of comparability is based on
the similarity with which accounting data react to economic events. There are several reasons for which I
use the measurement derived by De Franco et al. (2011) rather than the input-based approach : 1) it is more
relevant for accounting information users because their focus is on the output; 2) it is more objective as it
does not require the selection and weighting of the inputs; 3) it is easier to implement in practical terms due
to the widely available data sources; and 4) it is potentially more accurate in measuring accounting
comparability because it allows researchers to control for the similarity of economic events.
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De Franco et al. (2011) suggest a comparability measure that is very popular and widely used. I
use this comparability measure. First, I estimate the following firm-year equation over the most recent four
year period, including the current year and previous three years:
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,
where 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 is earnings before extraordinary items scaled by market value of equity nine months
prior to the fiscal year-end. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the buy-and-hold percentage stock return from nine months prior
to the fiscal year-end to three months after the fiscal year-end. I require each firm to have available data for
the entire sample period (2000-2018) and winsorize the top and bottom one percent of the distributions of
Earnings and Return to reduce the influence of outliers. The coefficients 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are the estimates of the
accounting function for firm i during the four years included in each regressioin and reflect how economic
events (i.e., Return) are reflected in accounting income (i.e., Earnings). Similarly, the accounting function
for firm j is reflected by 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 , estimated using the earnings and return for firm j.
The similarity of the functions for firm i and firm j represents the comparability of their accounting.
To estimate the similarity in functions, I predict firm i’s earnings using its own function and firm j’s function,
but assuming the same economic income (i.e., Return). Specifically, I calculate:
𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼̂𝑖 + 𝛽̂𝑖 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 ,
𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼̂𝑗 + 𝛽̂𝑗 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 ,
where 𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)𝑖𝑖𝑡 is the predicted earnings of firm i using firm i’s function and firm i’s return in period
t, and 𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the predicted earnings of firm i using firm j’s function and firm i’s return in period
t. The firm i and firm j are in the same industry. Using the same return to compute both predicted earnings
holds constant economic income. Next, I compute the accounting comparability between firm i and firm j
as the negative value of the average absolute difference between the predicted earnings using firm i’s and
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firm j’s accounting functions. I require that firm i and j be in the same three-digit SIC code, share the same
fiscal year-end date, and be from same country:
1

𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = (− ) × ∑𝑡𝑡−3|𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)𝑖𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)𝑖𝑗𝑡 |.
4
I compute a firm-level measure of accounting comparability by aggregating over all of the firm i
– firm j combinations for each industry. The comparability between firm i’s and firm j’s accounting systems
is estimated as the absolute difference between the predicted earnings using firm i’s and firm j’s accounting
functions multiplied by -1. The comparability measure has non-positive values. The comparability between
firm i and firm j, in a given industry and country, is higher when the comparability measure has higher
values because it represents a smaller absolute difference. I measure comparability Compijt, which is the
median of all of the comparability scores of firm i and j in period t in the same industry. Further, I compare
this measure across countries.

3.2.3. Country-level attributes
Previous international accounting research has used multiple country characteristics influencing
financial reporting quality. These country-level variables include geographic features (e.g. country latitude),
legal institutions (e.g. legal origin), religious affiliation (e.g. percentage catholic, religiosity), cultural
development (e.g. masculinity, societal trust) and economic outcomes (e.g. per capita GDP, market
capitalization, stock market participation), and so on. These country-level factors are associated with the
financial reporting environment, which has control over managers’ exercising of financial reporting
discretion. Therefore, my empirical research needs to consider these country-level factors. The main
challenge for an empirical test examining the impact of country-level attributes, however, is a long list of
country-level factors. Isidro et al. (2019) describe a way to efficiently and accurately use these countrylevel factors and thereby overcome such issues, by developing standardized scores of country factors for
47 countries.
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To capture the country-level attributes previously used in the literature, I use the four latent factors
proposed by Isidro et al. (2019) in building my empirical model. The international financial reporting
literature identifies 72 country-level attributes that explain financial reporting differences around the world.
Isidro et al. (2019) suggest that these country-level attributes can be categorized as four underlying factors
that explain most of the variation in these attributes across countries. Among these four factors, Corporate
Environment is associated with the institutional and governance system, and economic and social welfare,
Investor Protection is associated with investor rights protection and capital markets development,
Governance Environment is associated with political transparency and accounting enforcement, and
External Investors is associated with the openness of society to external investors. They use factor analysis,
which takes into account the correlation patterns among the country-level attributes. The factor analysis
significantly reduces the number of possible country-level attributes that explain variation in financial
reporting. These four factors explain about 58% of total variation, with the first two factors alone explaining
a significant portion (80%) of that variation2. Since I use the standardized scores of four factors presented
by Isidro et al. (2019) on 72 country variables for 47 countries, a concern that my study does not consider
weights of each factor can be addressed. Thus, country-level attributes are categorized as four latent factors
that are 1) associated with institutions and culture, and economic and social welfare (Corporate
Environment), 2) associated with strong protection of investors’ rights and capital markets development
(Investor Protection), 3) associated with political transparency, and tax and accounting enforcement
(Governance Environment), and 4) associated with openness of society to external investors (External
Investors). Although these four factors cannot explain country-level financial reporting differences fully,
they enable me to observe the effects of almost all of country-level factors. Each factor score is publicly
available in Isidro et al. (2019). Therefore, by using these four latent factors instead of almost of all country-

2

Isidro et al. (2019) provide weights of the four factors. Corporate Environment (Factor 1) has weight of 0.531,
Investor Protection (Factor 2) has 0.259, Governance Environment (Factor 3) has 0.120, and External Investors
(Factor 4) has 0.088.
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level attributes, I efficiently test how these four latent country-level factors affect managerial discretion in
financial reporting.

3.3. REGRESSION MODELS
3.3.1. Test of Hypothesis I
To test the relationship between proprietary costs of financial reporting and financial statement
comparability across countries, I use the regression model developed by Imhof et al. (2018). I employ the
following model to examine how proprietary costs of financial reporting and managers’ discretion affect
financial statement comparability across countries where financial reporting environments vary
considerably. Given the conflict regarding the association between proprietary costs and comparability, this
international setting can provide a more acceptable relationship.
(1) 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐢𝐣𝐭 = 𝛂𝟎 + 𝛂𝟏 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬𝐢𝐭 + 𝛂𝟐 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐨𝐥𝐬𝐢𝐭 + 𝐅𝐢𝐱𝐞𝐝 𝐄𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬 + 𝛆𝐢𝐭 ,
(2) 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐢𝐣𝐭 = 𝛂𝟎 + 𝛂𝟏 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬𝐢𝐭 + 𝛂𝟐 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐨𝐥𝐬𝐢𝐭 + 𝐅𝐢𝐱𝐞𝐝 𝐄𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬 + 𝛆𝐢𝐭 (partitioned
by strong / poor financial reporting environment),
where 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐢𝐣𝐭 represents measure of comparability of De Franco et al. (2011), which is firm-level variable,
and 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬𝐢𝐭 is measured by (1) Follower, which is determined by market share, and (2)
ADJ_SPEED. For the first proxy (Follower), industry follower is set equal to 1, 0 otherwise. All variables
in the model are firm-level variables. In regression model (2), I group the entire sample by sum of weighted
score of a factor one, two, three, and four proposed by Isidro et al. (2019). If the total score of each country
is beyond the median of total scores, the country is grouped as a strong financial reporting regime, otherwise
the country is classified as a poor financial reporting regime. Following previous studies, I control for the
determinants of financial statement comparability. I control for size and book-to-market ratio (Lang et al.,
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2010), leverage ratio, cash flows from operations, the variance of cash flows, sales and growth in sales, and
stock returns (Francis et al., 2013). Also, I control for accrual quality (Kothari et al., 2005), since the
absolute value of discretionary accruals lowers financial statement comparability. In addition, I control for
country-level using all four latent factors, since they include almost all factors that affect the financial
reporting outcomes in a country (Isidro et al. 2019). Thus, I include firm- and year-, and industry-fixed
effects, respectively. Industry fixed effects are based on three-digit SIC codes. Moreover, because both
proxies of proprietary costs vary by firm over time, this empirical test requires firm-fixed effects, to mitigate
the bias in the coefficients of this empirical model. Further, I include year dummies for year-fixed effects.
If the coefficient of 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬𝐢𝐭 in the regression model (1) is significantly negative, it disputes
that, in competitive industries, managers use discretion for comparable financial statements. If the result
supports H1, in the regression model (2), the coefficient of 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬𝐢𝐭 in countries with poor
financial reporting environment has a larger absolute value than the coefficient in countries with strong
financial reporting environment. To test for differences in the coefficient of 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬𝐢𝐭 under
sample of countries with strong financial environment and poor financial reporting environment, I use a ttest3.

3.3.2. Test of Hypothesis II
Models (3) and (4) test the impact of country-level attributes on the association between proprietary
costs and financial statement comparability. First, I regress model (3) separately for two subsamples
partitioned by median weighted score of each country-level attribute, and then compare the coefficients
between the two groups. The high score group includes observations with country-level attribute scores
above median across countries, while the low score group contains observations with scores below the
median. Thus, a higher score of each factor indicates better financial reporting environment. In addition,

3

T-test is most useful in determining if there is a statistically significant difference between two independent sample
groups
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the regression (4) includes an interaction term of country-level attributes and proprietary costs to investigate
the joint effect of country-level attributes. For easier interpretation, I use the low score group as the countrylevel attributes in the interaction term (Corp_Env_low, Inv_Prot_low, Gov_Env_low, Ext_Invest_low).
Each attribute in this empirical test is the score of Corp_Env, Inv_Prot, Gov_Env, and Ext_Invest,
respectively.
(3) 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐢𝐣𝐭 = 𝛂𝟎 + 𝛂𝟏 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬𝐢𝐭 + 𝛂𝟐 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐨𝐥𝐬𝐢𝐭 + 𝐅𝐢𝐱𝐞𝐝 𝐄𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬 + 𝛆𝐢𝐭 (partitioned
based on each country-level attribute),
(4) 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐢𝐣𝐭 = 𝛂𝟎 + 𝛂𝟏 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬𝐢𝐭 + 𝛂𝟐 𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐞𝐬 𝐢𝐭 +
𝛂𝟑 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬𝐢𝐭 × 𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐞𝐬 𝐢𝐭 + 𝛂𝟒 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐨𝐥𝐬𝐢𝐭 + 𝐅𝐢𝐱𝐞𝐝 𝐄𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬 + 𝛆𝐢𝐭 ,
where 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒊𝒋𝒕 represents the measure of comparability from De Franco et al. (2011), and
𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬𝐢𝐭 is measured by (1) Follower, which is grouped by market share, and (2)
ADJ_SPEED. For the variable of Follower, industry follower is set equal to 1, 0 otherwise. For countrylevel attributes in the interaction term, group of low score of each factor equals to 1, otherwise 0. The low
score group (Corp_Env_low, Inv_Prot_low, Gov_Env_low, Ext_Invest_low) consists of scores less than
the median. Given H2, in the model (3), I expect that the absolute value of the coefficient of
𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬𝐢𝐭 in the high score group would be smaller than in the low score group. The
relationship between the proprietary costs of financial reporting and financial statement comparability is
more negative in countries with poor Corporate Environments, due to increased exercised discretion. In
model (4), I expect the coefficient of the interaction term to be significantly negative. Since I use low score
group as the country-level attribute, the absolute value of the coefficient of the interaction term is expected
to be larger than the absolute value of the coefficient of the proprietary costs variable. Following previous
studies, I control for the determinants of financial statement comparability. I control for size and book-tomarket ratio (Lang et al., 2010), leverage ratio, cash flows from operations, the variance of cash flows, sales
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and growth in sales, and stock returns (Francis et al., 2014). Also, I control for accrual quality (Kothari et
al., 2005), since the absolute value of discretionary accruals lowers financial statement comparability. Thus,
I include firm- and year-, and industry-fixed effects, respectively. I also include year dummies for yearfixed effects.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics by country-level, and firm-level are shown in Table 1. Table 2 provides the
Pearson correlation matrix among the variables used in my empirical tests. In Table 1, Panel A reports the
mean values of each variable for each country. The ‘OBS’ column of Panel A shows that the sizes of the
country samples range from 11 observations for Canada to 14,950 observations for Japan. Since I multiply
absolute value of Financial statement comparability (COMP) by -1, all values are negative. Argentina (0.088), Austria (-0.092), Canada (-0.092), Mexico (-0.091), Taiwan (-0.092), and USA (-0.093) show
higher level of accounting comparability, while Chile (-0.493), Greece (-0.237), Indonesia (-2.233), and
Italy (-0.461) present lower level of comparability. Proprietary costs of financial reporting variables
(ADJ_SPEED, Follower) also show variation across countries. For ADJ_SPEED, Norway shows the
highest proprietary costs among these countries. Also, Panel A reports percentage of industry followers in
each country. In total, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Belgium likely have larger portion of followers,
compared to other countries. Followers are more likely to have higher proprietary costs of financial
reporting, since predation risk brings higher competitive environment. Panel B of Table 1 reports the
descriptive statistics for firm-level variables used in the empirical tests. The mean and median of
ADJ_SPEED (Follower) are 0.283 (0.626) and 0.187 (1), respectively. Most of the control variables’
means and medians are close to those reported by Haw et al. (2015).
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix among the firm-level regression variables. Consistent with
literature, financial statement comparability (COMP) is negatively correlated with ADJ_SPEED, follower,
suggesting that both have negative effects on financial statement comparability. In addition, financial
statement comparability (COMP) is positively associated with accrual quality, indicating that less use of
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managerial financial reporting discretion likely brings about better financial statement comparability. Also,
Comparability is positively related to leverage ratio and size, and market-to-book ratio. However, these
correlation results should be interpreted with caution, because this pairwise correlation may suffer from the
correlated omitted variables problem, which is controlled for in the following regression analyses.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Panel A. Country-level Statistics
COUNTRY

OBS.

COMP

ADJ_SPEED

FOLLOWER

CORP_ENV

INV_PROT

GOV_ENV

EXT_INVEST

ARG

104

-0.088

-0.038

0.520

-0.517

-1.15

-0.783

1.786

AUS

3,741

-0.143

-0.127

0.495

0.624

1.197

1.192

0.258

AUT

398

-0.092

-0.156

0.673

1.382

-1.199

-0.512

0.762

BEL

665

-0.134

-0.187

0.711

0.837

-0.729

-0.333

-0.284

BRA

828

-0.092

-0.147

0.413

-0.651

-1.19

0.374

0.949

CAN

11

-0.092

0.198

0.154

0.517

1.243

1.933

0.203

CHE

1,400

-0.094

-0.155

0.695

1.459

0.096

0.101

-0.344

CHL

333

-0.493

-0.031

0.548

0.26

-0.036

-1.716

1.452

CHN

11,772

-0.096

-0.050

0.361

-0.58

-0.055

-0.744

-1.828

COL

50

-0.094

0.106

0.185

-0.962

-0.501

-0.391

1.211

CZE

60

-0.093

-0.060

0.810

0.12

-0.51

-0.368

-0.409

DEU

3,535

-0.093

-0.145

0.611

1.171

-1.14

0.741

-0.813

DNK

590

-0.119

-0.130

0.583

1.319

0.109

0.681

0.269

ESP

667

-0.130

-0.135

0.682

0.401

-0.586

0.087

0.122

FIN

1,165

-0.097

-0.152

0.772

1.555

-0.215

-0.335

0.172

FRA

3,489

-0.095

-0.139

0.639

0.729

-0.564

0.169

-0.92

GBR

7,361

-0.114

-0.157

0.495

0.696

1.56

0.905

-0.424

GRC

472

-0.237

-0.173

0.671

0.104

-1.398

-0.756

-0.392

HKG

2,305

-0.099

-0.155

0.491

0.662

2.822

-1.827

0.419

IDN

762

-2.233

-0.059

0.495

-1.647

-0.196

-0.746

-1.114

IND

3,633

-0.114

-0.127

0.353

-1.256

0.674

0.839

-0.026

IRL

260

-0.192

-0.120

0.528

0.99

1.081

-0.716

2.12

ISR

318

-0.096

-0.113

0.472

0.064

0.789

-0.207

1.456

ITA

1,268

-0.461

-0.166

0.627

0.335

-0.926

0.099

-0.621

JPN

14,950

-0.098

-0.096

0.665

0.88

-0.541

-0.765

-2.617

KEN

70

-0.093

-0.104

0.200

-1.37

-0.274

1.413

0.219

KOR

2,166

-0.094

-0.102

0.306

0.046

-0.421

-0.797

-1.562
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MEX

494

-0.091

-0.077

0.571

-0.53

-1.115

-0.871

1.784

MYS

2,518

-0.094

-0.185

0.442

-1.077

1.856

-1.054

-0.949

NGA

94

-0.093

0.066

0.117

-1.781

0.003

1.795

-0.099

NLD

815

-0.157

-0.151

0.543

1.176

-0.256

0.738

0.424

NOR

1,102

-0.112

-0.236

0.500

1.373

-0.67

1.489

-0.306

NZL

621

-0.095

-0.113

0.601

0.792

0.986

0.582

0.684

PAK

277

-0.091

0.029

0.373

-1.848

0.038

1.123

-0.024

PER

117

-0.176

0.032

0.454

-1.053

-0.424

-0.625

1.539

PHL

365

-0.098

-0.038

0.472

-1.591

-0.138

0.248

0.319

POL

675

-0.092

-0.066

0.324

0.045

-0.8

-0.415

0.178

PRT

271

-0.138

-0.207

0.746

0.471

-1.053

-0.846

0.591

RUS

322

-0.109

0.036

0.177

-0.589

-0.519

-1.012

-0.631

SGP

1,183

-0.109

-0.174

0.402

0.159

2.804

-1.859

0.015

SWE

1,416

-0.092

-0.080

0.499

1.405

-0.443

0.937

-0.164

THA

1,004

-0.093

-0.152

0.441

-1.136

0.612

-1.075

-1.441

TUR

558

-0.189

-0.147

0.539

-0.82

-0.925

-0.419

-0.263

TWN

3,598

-0.092

-0.003

0.405

-0.093

0.128

-0.562

-1.934

USA

73

-0.093

-0.154

0.415

0.315

1.152

2.267

-0.288

ZAF

1,037

-0.100

-0.143

0.584

-0.791

0.84

0.95

0.315

ZWE

24

-0.094

0.108

0.056

-1.595

-0.019

1.071

0.21

78,937

Panel B. Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLE
MEAN
MEDIAN
STD.DEV
Q1
Q3
COMP
-0.0917
-0.0938
0.0085
-0.0956
-0.0910
ADJ_SPEED
0.283
0.187
0.292
0.0430
0.626
FOLLOWER
0.626
1
0.484
0
1
ACCRUAL QUALITY
0.0192
0.0135
0.0174
0.0064
0.0280
LEV
0.395
0.385
0.283
0.085
0.730
SIZE
8.776
8.657
3.020
6.614
10.92
OPERATING CASH FLOW
0.0786
0.0752
0.0567
0.0359
0.120
STD_CASHFLOW
0.288
0.291
0.0283
0.272
0.306
STD_SALE
0.298
0.300
0.0361
0.275
0.317
STD_SALE GROWTH
0.162
0.157
0.0325
0.147
0.174
STOCK RETURN
0.0033
0.0003
0.300
-0.349
0.357
MTB
1.923
1.639
0.991
0.963
2.923
Note: Panel A of Table 1 presents the country-level summary statistics for the research variables for 78,937
observations over the 2000–2018 period. The mean values of each variable are calculated and reported for each sample
country. Panel B presents the mean, median, and standard deviation statistics for the firm-level variables. See
Appendix A for variable descriptions.
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Note: The correlation coefficients in bold are significant at the 1 percent level. Panel E presents Pearson correlation matrix for the firm-level
variables for 78,937 observations over the 2000-2018 period. See Appendix A for variable definitions.

Table2. Correlation Matrix

4.2. Empirical Findings
4.2.1. Regression results regarding Hypothesis I
Table 3 shows the basic regression results that test the effect of proprietary costs of financial
reporting on financial statement comparability. It reports the coefficients and significance levels for the
entire sample, with column (1) measuring proprietary costs with speed of profit adjustment(ADJ_SPEED),
which is an indicator of the speed of abnormal profits away from the industry mean and with column (2)
measuring proprietary costs with Follower, which is a dichotomous variable. Firms within the same
industry are sorted into quartiles according to their market shares, and those in the top quartile are identified
as Leader, otherwise Follower. Follower is set equal to 1, 0 otherwise. Each column also includes the
coefficients of control variables identified in previous chapter. In column (3), I include both proxies for
proprietary costs of financial reporting.
As shown in Table 3, the coefficients on proprietary costs are significantly negative in both columns
(1) and (2), indicating the negative impact of high proprietary costs of financial reporting on financial
statement comparability in my cross-country sample (-0.0378, with p-value < 0.01 in column (1) ; -0.0200,
with p-value < 0.01 in column (2); in column (3), the coefficient on ADJ_SPEED (Follower) is -0.0356,
p-value < 0.01 (-0.0200, p-value < 0.01)). The significantly negative coefficient on ADJ_SPEED in column
(1) indicates that higher proprietary costs are associated with less comparable financial statements. The
speed with which those industry participants with above-average profits have their positive abnormal
profitability revert to the industry mean is fast in competitive industries. The significantly negative
coefficient on Follower also indicates that higher proprietary costs are related to less comparable financial
reporting. Industry followers face greater competitive pressures because of predation risk. These results are
consistent with the results found by Imhof et al. (2018), refuting the argument that managers use discretion
for comparable financial statements and that competitive environments play a governance role in
management. Hence, the empirical results in Table 3 show that the proprietary costs of financial reporting
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are negatively associated with financial statement comparability across countries, no matter which proxy
of proprietary costs identified in previous section are used in the test. Further, in panel D, the results of the
t-test indicate that the negative relation is stronger in countries with poor financial reporting environment.
Table 3. Results regarding the relationship between proprietary costs of financial reporting and
financial statement comparability
VARIABLES

Predicted
sign

ADJ_SPEED

(−)

Follower

(−)

Dependent Variable = Financial Statement Comparability (Comp)
Column (1)
Column (2)
Column (3)
Panel A. Entire Countries
-0.0378***
(0.0037)
-0.0200***
(0.0006)
78,937
0.686

Observations
78,937
R-squared
0.682
Fixed Effects (Firm, Year,
Y
Y
and Industry)
Panel B. Countries with Strong Financial Reporting Environment
ADJ_SPEED
(−)
-0.0273***
(0.0052)
Follower

(−)

-0.0020*
(0.0001)
39,815
0.764

Observations
39,815
R-squared
0.699
Fixed Effects (Firm, Year,
Y
Y
and Industry)
Panel C. Countries with Poor Financial Reporting Environment
ADJ_SPEED
(−)
-0.0505***
(0.0057)
Follower
(−)
-0.0198***
(0.0007)
Observations
39,122
39,122
R-squared
0.641
0.638
Fixed Effects (Firm, Year,
Y
Y
and Industry)
Panel D. T-Test: Poor FRE - Strong FRE
ADJ_SPEED
(−)
-0.0232***
Follower
(−)
-0.0178***

-0.0356***
(0.0036)
-0.0200***
(0.0006)
78,937
0.686
Y
-0.0257***
(0.0051)
-0.0020***
(0.0001)
39,815
0.764
Y
-0.0484***
(0.0057)
-0.0198***
(0.0007)
39,122
0.638
Y

-0.0227***
-0.0178***
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Table 3 is Comp, which is financial statement
comparability, calculated as the within industry mean of earnings-returns co-movement for all firm pairs in an industry
as in De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011). ADJ_SPEED measures the speed with which abnormal profits adjust to
the industry mean. Follower is set equal to 1 for a firm-year classified as industry follower if its market share is lower
than median of an industry based on three-digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. I partition entire sample, based on total
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financial reporting environment score, which is sum of weighted factor one, two, three, and four, according to Isidro
et al. (2019). I include firm- and year-, and industry-fixed effects, respectively. Industry fixed effects are based on
three-digit SIC codes. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions.

4.2.2. Regression results regarding Hypothesis II
In this section, I report the results for the tests of my main research question, which examines the
effects of country-level attributes on the relationship between proprietary costs of financial reporting and
financial statement comparability. I compute the effects of proprietary costs of financial reporting across
countries based on the four latent factors proposed by Isidro et al. (2019). The results of hypothesis 2 are
shown in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7. Panel A presents the results using speed of profit adjustment (ADJ_SPEED)
as proprietary costs, and Panel B shows results using Follower as proprietary costs proxy.
As shown in Table 4, Panel A, the coefficient on ADJ_SPEED is significantly negative in countries
with high score of Corp_Env (-0.0185, with p-value < 0.01), and also significantly negative in countries
with low score of Corp_Env (-0.0852, with p-value < 0.01). When comparing the two coefficients, the
negative relationship between proprietary costs and comparability is stronger in countries with a lower
score of Corp_Env. In addition to result of Corp_Env, in table 5, 6, and 7, the coefficients on
ADJ_SPEED are significantly negative in countries with high score of Inv_Prot, Gov_Env, and
Ext_Invest (-0.0329, with p-value < 0.01; -0.0227, with p-value < 0.01; -0.0191, with p-value < 0.01). The
negative coefficients do appear in results in countries with low score of Inv_Prot, Gov_Env, and
Ext_Invest (-0.0711, with p-value < 0.01; -0.0342, with p-value < 0.01; -0.0452, with p-value < 0.01), but
these coefficients are smaller than those of the high score group. It indicates that the negative relationship
between proprietary costs and comparability is stronger in countries with lower score of Inv_Prot,
Gov_Env, and Ext_Invest. In the interaction column, I find that the absolute value of the coefficient of
interaction variable is larger than the absolute value of the coefficient of the proprietary costs variable. This
finding indicates that in countries with poorer financial reporting environment, the negative relationship
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between proprietary costs and comparability is more pronounced. Taken together, my results imply that the
effect of proprietary costs of financial reporting on financial statement comparability depends on the
country-level institutional, cultural, investor protection, and even economic factors. Moreover, the impact
of country-level attributes on the negative relation is the largest for Inv_Prot, while Gov_Env has the
lowest impact on the relationship (Impact: Inv_Prot > Corp_Env > Ext_Invest > Gov_Env). To put it
another way, poor financial reporting environments allow managers to use more discretion, intensifying the
negative association between proprietary costs and comparability.
In panel B of table 4, 5, 6, and 7, I use the Follower dummy variable as a proxy for proprietary
costs of financial reporting. After controlling for firm-, industry-, and country-level variables, the
coefficients on Follower are significantly negative in countries with high score of Corp_Env, Inv_Prot,
Gov_Env, and Ext_Invest (-0.0154, with p-value < 0.01; -0.0197, with p-value < 0.01; -0.0163, with pvalue < 0.01; -0.0218, with p-value < 0.01), consistent with the results in panel A. Comparing the high
score and low score columns, I find that the coefficients in countries with low score of Corp_Env, Inv_Prot,
Gov_Env, and Ext_Invest (-0.0230, with p-value < 0.01; -0.1935, with p-value < 0.01; -0.0241, with pvalue < 0.01; -0.1758, with p-value < 0.01) have smaller value than in countries with a high score (above
median). As panel A reveals, I find that the absolute value of the coefficient of the interaction variable is
larger than that of the main interest variable in panel B. This finding indicates that in countries with poorer
financial reporting environment, comparability is reduced further, as proprietary costs increase. Taken
together, the results highlight the effects of country-level attributes on controlling managers’ financial
reporting discretion. This, in turn, intensifies the negative relationship between proprietary costs of financial
reporting and financial statement comparability. Like panel A, the joint effect of Inv_Prot on the negative
relation is the largest, while Gov_Env has the lowest impact on the relationship, in panel B (Impact:
Inv_Prot > Ext_Invest > Corp_Env> Gov_Env).
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Table 4. Results regarding Hypothesis 2 (a)
Panel A. The speed of profit adjustment measure
VARIABLES

Predicted
sign

ADJ_SPEED

(−)

Corp_Env

(+)

ADJ_SPEED× Corp_Env_low

(−)

Accrual Quality
LEV
Size
Operating Cash Flow
Std_cashflow
Std_sale
Std_sale growth
Stock return
MTB
Constant

Dependent Variable = Financial Statement Comparability (Comp)
High score
Low score
Interaction term
(Corp_Env)
(Corp_Env)
-0.0185***
-0.0852***
-0.0378***
(0.0041)
(0.0075)
(0.0037)
0.0991***
0.0114**
0.0174***
(0.0111)
(0.0054)
(0.0081)
-0.0087**
(0.0032)
0.0223***
0.0180***
0.0243***
(0.0032)
(0.0029)
(0.0022)
0.0324***
0.0279***
0.0287***
(0.005)
(0.0026)
(0.0030)
0.0113***
0.0202***
0.0165***
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
(0.0005)
0.0725***
0.0615**
0.0625**
(0.0144)
(0.0321)
(0.0462)
-0.0259***
-0.0265***
-0.0264***
(0.0073)
(0.0028)
(0.0035)
-0.1084**
0.0010
-0.0331***
(0.0077)
(0.0031)
(0.0038)
-0.0194***
0.0007
-0.0084**
(0.0041)
(0.0015)
(0.0019)
-0.0430***
-0.0708***
-0.0593***
(0.0065)
(0.0031)
(0.0035)
0.0161***
0.0002
0.0110***
(0.0039)
(0.0016)
(0.0019)
-0.0862***
-0.113***
-0.101***
(0.0010)
(0.0008)
(0.0006)
35,120
43,817
78,937
0.745
0.626
0.682

Observations
R-squared
Fixed Effects (Firm, Year, and
Y
Y
Y
Industry)
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Table 4 is Comp, which is financial statement
comparability, calculated as the within industry mean of earnings-returns co-movement for all firm pairs in an industry
as in De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011). ADJ_SPEED measures the speed with which abnormal profits adjust to
the industry mean. I separate two subsamples partitioned by median of weighted score of Corp_Env. High score group
includes observations with Corp_Env scores above median, while low score group contains observations with scores
below the median. In the interaction term, group of low score of Corp_Env_low equals to 1, otherwise 0. The low
score group of Corp_Env_low consists of scores less than median. I include firm- and year-, and industry-fixed effects,
respectively. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions.
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Panel B. Industry Follower measure
VARIABLES

Predicted
sign

Follower

(−)

Corp_Env

(+)

Follower× Corp_Env_low

(−)

Accrual Quality
LEV
Size
Operating Cash Flow
Std_cashflow
Std_sale
Std_sale growth
Stock return
MTB
Constant

Dependent Variable = Financial Statement Comparability (Comp)
High score
Low score
Interaction term
(Corp_Env)
(Corp_Env)
-0.0154***
-0.0230***
-0.0232***
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
(0.0010)
0.0098*
0.0008*
0.0017**
(0.0060)
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
-0.0067***
(0.0011)
0.0181***
0.0155***
0.0210***
(0.0032)
(0.0029)
(0.0022)
0.1140***
0.0079
0.0431***
(0.016)
(0.0067)
(0.0080)
0.0832***
0.0381***
0.0424***
(0.0240)
(0.0121)
(0.0130)
0.0053***
0.0025**
0.0052***
(0.0004)
(0.0002)
(0.0004)
-0.1940**
-0.0307
-0.0790**
(0.0724)
(0.0279)
(0.0345)
-0.1610**
0.0022
-0.0661*
(0.0760)
(0.0307)
(0.0371)
-0.1820***
-0.0002
-0.0811***
(0.0390)
(0.0142)
(0.0179)
-0.0574***
-0.0726***
-0.0674***
(0.0066)
(0.0032)
(0.0035)
0.0136***
0.0017***
0.0100***
(0.0039)
(0.0003)
(0.0019)
-0.0834***
-0.1100***
-0.0959***
(0.0010)
(0.0008)
(0.0006)
35,113
43,797
78,910
0.750
0.631
0.687

Observations
R-squared
Fixed Effects (Firm, Year,
Y
Y
Y
and Industry)
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Table 4 is Comp, which is financial statement
comparability, calculated as the within industry mean of earnings-returns co-movement for all firm pairs in an industry
as in De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011). Follower is set equal to 1 for a firm-year classified as industry follower
if its market share is lower than median of an industry based on three-digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. I separate two
subsamples partitioned median of weighted score of Corp_Env. High score group includes observations Corp_Env
scores above median, while low score group contains observations with scores below the median. In the interaction
term, group of low score of Corp_Env_low equals to 1, otherwise 0. The low score group of Corp_Env_low consists
of scores less than median. I include firm- and year-, and industry-fixed effects, respectively. See Appendix A for
detailed variable definitions.
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Table 5. Results regarding Hypothesis 2 (b)
Panel A. The speed of profit adjustment measure
VARIABLES

Predicted
sign

ADJ_SPEED

(−)

Inv_Prot

(+)

ADJ_SPEED× Inv_Prot_low

(−)

Accrual Quality
LEV
Size
Operating Cash Flow
Std_cashflow
Std_sale
Std_sale growth
Stock return
MTB
Constant

Dependent Variable = Financial Statement Comparability (Comp)
High score
Low score
Interaction term
(Inv_Prot)
(Inv_Prot)
-0.0329***
-0.0711***
-0.0378***
(0.0040)
(0.0082)
(0.0037)
0.0016**
0.0001**
0.0006**
(0.0005)
(0.0000)
(0.0002)
-0.0131***
(0.0034)
0.0165***
0.0253***
0.0244***
(0.0037)
(0.0027)
(0.0022)
0.150***
0.0151**
0.0399***
(0.0206)
(0.00668)
(0.0081)
0.0916***
0.0549***
0.0366***
(0.0287)
(0.0109)
(0.0122)
0.0011**
0.0003*
0.0003*
(0.0005)
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
-0.0212**
-0.0432
-0.0557**
(0.0086)
(0.0287)
(0.0144)
-0.0198**
0.0412
0.0301*
(0.0089)
(0.0315)
(0.0156)
-0.0160***
-0.0391***
-0.0177**
(0.0047)
(0.0146)
(0.0784)
-0.0319***
-0.0774***
-0.0594***
(0.0074)
(0.0032)
(0.0035)
0.0224***
0.0010
0.0110***
(0.0045)
(0.0017)
(0.0019)
-0.0927***
-0.104***
-0.101***
(0.0011)
(0.0007)
(0.0006)
27,627
51,310
78,937
0.768
0.620
0.682
Y
Y
Y

Observations
R-squared
Fixed Effects (Firm, Year, and
Industry)
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Table 5 is Comp, which is financial statement
comparability, calculated as the within industry mean of earnings-returns co-movement for all firm pairs in an industry
as in De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011). ADJ_SPEED measures the speed with which abnormal profits adjust to
the industry mean. I separate two subsamples partitioned median of weighted score of Inv_Prot. High score group
includes observations with Inv_Prot scores above median, while low score group contains observations with scores
below the median. In the interaction term, group of low score of Inv_Prot_low equals to 1, otherwise 0. The low score
group of Inv_Prot_low consists of scores less than median. I include firm- and year-, and industry-fixed effects,
respectively. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions.
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Panel B. Industry Follower measure
VARIABLES

Predicted
sign

Follower

(−)

Inv_Prot

(+)

Follower× Inv_Prot_low

(−)

Accrual Quality
LEV
Size
Operating Cash Flow
Std_cashflow
Std_sale
Std_sale growth
Stock return
MTB
Constant

Dependent Variable = Financial Statement Comparability (Comp)
High score
Low score
Interaction term
(Inv_Prot)
(Inv_Prot)
-0.0197***
-0.1935***
-0.0248***
(0.0008)
(0.0103)
(0.0009)
0.0229***
0.0006**
0.0079***
(0.0052)
(0.0003)
(0.0027)
-0.0086***
(0.0011)
0.0125***
0.0222***
0.0209***
(0.0037)
(0.0026)
(0.00217)
0.1600***
0.0156**
0.0425***
(0.0206)
(0.0067)
(0.0081)
0.1023***
0.0079***
0.0430***
(0.0302)
(0.0115)
(0.0130)
0.0376***
0.0068***
0.0050***
(0.0051)
(0.0020)
(0.0019)
-0.2070**
-0.0452
-0.0786**
(0.0856)
(0.0287)
(0.0345)
-0.0230***
0.0413
-0.0066*
(0.0089)
(0.0315)
(0.0037)
-0.1550***
-0.0399***
-0.0808***
(0.047)
(0.0146)
(0.0179)
-0.0447***
-0.0807***
-0.0675***
(0.0074)
(0.0032)
(0.0035)
0.0204***
0.0018***
0.0101***
(0.0045)
(0.0004)
(0.0019)
-0.0899***
-0.0999***
-0.0963***
(0.0011)
(0.0008)
(0.0006)
27,620
51,290
78,910
0.771
0.625
0.687
Y
Y
Y

Observations
R-squared
Fixed Effects (Firm, Year,
and Industry)
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Table 5 is Comp, which is financial statement
comparability, calculated as the within industry mean of earnings-returns co-movement for all firm pairs in an industry
as in De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011). Follower is set equal to 1 for a firm-year classified as industry follower
if its market share is lower than median of an industry based on three-digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. I separate two
subsamples partitioned median of weighted score of Inv_Prot. High score group includes observations Inv_Prot
scores above median, while low score group contains observations with scores below the median. In the interaction
term, group of low score of Inv_Prot_low equals to 1, otherwise 0. The low score group of Inv_Prot_low consists of
scores less than median. I include firm- and year-, and industry-fixed effects, respectively. See Appendix A for detailed
variable definitions.
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Table 6. Results regarding Hypothesis 2 (c)
Panel A. The speed of profit adjustment measure
VARIABLES

Predicted
sign

ADJ_SPEED

(−)

Gov_Env

(+)

ADJ_SPEED× Gov_Env_low

(−)

Accrual Quality
LEV
Size
Operating Cash Flow
Std_cashflow
Std_sale
Std_sale growth
Stock return
MTB
Constant

Dependent Variable = Financial Statement Comparability (Comp)
High score
Low score
Interaction term
(Gov_Env)
(Gov_Env)
-0.0227***
-0.0342***
-0.0379***
(0.0085)
(0.0045)
(0.0037)
0.0162***
0.0011**
0.0069**
(0.0026)
(0.0007)
(0.0033)
-0.0011***
(0.0003)
0.0294***
0.0175***
0.0245***
(0.0031)
(0.0030)
(0.0022)
0.1160***
0.0112
0.0400***
(0.0157)
(0.0071)
(0.0081)
0.6730***
0.0639***
0.3660***
(0.0219)
(0.0115)
(0.0122)
0.0123***
0.0048**
0.0053***
(0.0044)
(0.0022)
(0.0019)
-0.1010
-0.0360
-0.0780**
(0.0624)
(0.0317)
(0.0345)
-0.125*
0.0130
-0.0599
(0.0666)
(0.0345)
(0.0372)
-0.128***
-0.0244
-0.0829***
(0.0314)
(0.0170)
(0.0179)
-0.0580***
-0.0589***
-0.0593***
(0.0066)
(0.0031)
(0.0035)
0.0238***
0.0029*
0.0110***
(0.0036)
(0.0017)
(0.0019)
-0.0940***
-0.105***
-0.101***
(0.0010)
(0.0008)
(0.0006)
39,033
39,904
78,937
0.720
0.655
0.682
Y
Y
Y

Observations
R-squared
Fixed Effects (Firm, Year, and
Industry)
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Table 6 is Comp, which is financial statement
comparability, calculated as the within industry mean of earnings-returns co-movement for all firm pairs in an industry
as in De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011). ADJ_SPEED measures the speed with which abnormal profits adjust to
the industry mean. I separate two subsamples partitioned median of weighted score of Gov_Env. High score group
includes observations with Gov_Env scores above median, while low score group contains observations with scores
below the median. In the interaction term, group of low score of Gov_Env_low equals to 1, otherwise 0. The low score
group of Gov_Env_low consists of scores less than median. I include firm- and year-, and industry-fixed effects,
respectively. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions.
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Panel B. Industry Follower measure
VARIABLES

Predicted
sign

Follower

(−)

Gov_Env

(+)

Follower× Gov_Env_low

(−)

Accrual Quality
LEV
Size
Operating Cash Flow
Std_cashflow
Std_sale
Std_sale growth
Stock return
MTB
Constant

Dependent Variable = Financial Statement Comparability (Comp)
High score
Low score
Interaction term
(Gov_Env)
(Gov_Env)
-0.0163***
-0.0241***
-0.0239***
(0.0015)
(0.0009)
(0.0019)
0.0196***
-0.0004
0.0029***
(0.0027)
(0.0008)
(0.0005)
-0.0053***
(0.0011)
0.0249***
0.0145***
0.0211***
(0.0031)
(0.0030)
(0.0022)
0.120***
0.0118*
0.0422***
(0.0157)
(0.0071)
(0.0081)
0.778***
0.0852***
0.430***
(0.0233)
(0.0123)
(0.0130)
0.0413***
0.0249***
0.0314***
(0.0053)
(0.0253)
(0.0056)
-0.0989
-0.0373
-0.0794**
(0.0622)
(0.0317)
(0.0345)
-0.143**
0.0123
-0.0659*
(0.0664)
(0.0346)
(0.0371)
-0.124***
-0.0241
-0.0812***
(0.0313)
(0.0170)
(0.0179)
-0.0717***
-0.0615***
-0.0675***
(0.0067)
(0.0031)
(0.0035)
0.0221***
0.00315*
0.0101***
(0.0036)
(0.0017)
(0.0019)
-0.0867***
-0.102***
-0.0960***
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
(0.0006)
39,029
39,881
78,910
0.726
0.659
0.687
Y
Y
Y

Observations
R-squared
Fixed Effects (Firm, Year, and
Industry)
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Table 6 is Comp, which is financial statement
comparability, calculated as the within industry mean of earnings-returns co-movement for all firm pairs in an industry
as in De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011). Follower is set equal to 1 for a firm-year classified as industry follower
if its market share is lower than median of an industry based on three-digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. I separate two
subsamples partitioned median of weighted score of Gov_Env. High score group includes observations Gov_Env
scores above median, while low score group contains observations with scores below the median. In the interaction
term, group of low score of Gov_Env_low equals to 1, otherwise 0. The low score group of Gov_Env_low consists of
scores less than median. I include firm- and year-, and industry-fixed effects, respectively. See Appendix A for detailed
variable definitions.
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Table 7. Results regarding Hypothesis 2 (d)
Panel A. The speed of profit adjustment measure
VARIABLES

Predicted
sign

ADJ_SPEED

(−)

Ext_Invest

(+)

ADJ_SPEED× Ext_Invest_low

(−)

Accrual Quality
LEV
Size
Operating Cash Flow
Std_cashflow
Std_sale
Std_sale growth
Stock return
MTB
Constant

Dependent Variable = Financial Statement Comparability (Comp)
High score
Low score
Interaction term
(Ext_Invest)
(Ext_Invest)
-0.0191***
-0.0452***
-0.0378***
(0.0072)
(0.0049)
(0.0037)
0.0235**
-0.0055***
0.0037*
(0.0112)
(0.0008)
(0.0027)
-0.0079**
(0.0031)
0.0172***
0.0256***
0.0245***
(0.0027)
(0.0032)
(0.0022)
0.115***
0.0172**
0.0400***
(0.0146)
(0.0084)
(0.0081)
0.840***
0.0390***
0.366***
(0.0216)
(0.0132)
(0.0122)
0.018***
0.008***
0.0175***
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
-0.0803
-0.0549
-0.0776**
(0.0588)
(0.0375)
(0.0345)
-0.1770***
0.0508
-0.0599
(0.0629)
(0.0408)
(0.0372)
-0.1120***
-0.0538**
-0.0827***
(0.0296)
(0.0201)
(0.0179)
-0.0357***
-0.0746***
-0.0593***
(0.0065)
(0.0036)
(0.0035)
0.0385***
0.0022***
0.0110***
(0.0036)
(0.0005)
(0.0019)
-0.0962***
-0.103***
-0.101***
(0.0008)
(0.0009)
(0.0006)
40,259
38,678
78,937
0.787
0.618
0.682
Y
Y
Y

Observations
R-squared
Fixed Effects (Firm, Year, and
Industry)
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Table 7 is Comp, which is financial statement
comparability, calculated as the within industry mean of earnings-returns co-movement for all firm pairs in an industry
as in De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011). ADJ_SPEED measures the speed with which abnormal profits adjust to
the industry mean. I separate two subsamples partitioned median of weighted score of Ext_Invest. High score group
includes observations with Ext_Invest scores above median, while low score group contains observations with scores
below the median. In the interaction term, group of low score of Ext_Invest_low equals to 1, otherwise 0. The low
score group of Ext_Invest_low consists of scores less than median. I include firm- and year-, and industry-fixed effects,
respectively. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions.
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Panel B. Industry Follower measure
VARIABLES

Predicted
sign

Follower

(−)

Ext_Invest

(+)

Follower× Ext_Invest_low

(−)

Accrual Quality
LEV
Size
Operating Cash Flow
Std_cashflow
Std_sale
Std_sale growth
Stock return
MTB
Constant

Dependent Variable = Financial Statement Comparability (Comp)
High score
Low score
Interaction term
(Ext_Invest)
(Ext_Invest)
-0.0218***
-0.1758***
-0.0236***
(0.0011)
(0.0072)
(0.0009)
0.0361***
-0.0005***
0.0056*
(0.0113)
(0.0001)
(0.0038)
-0.0069**
(0.0011)
0.0138***
0.0217***
0.0211***
(0.0027)
(0.0032)
(0.0022)
0.122***
0.0178**
0.0422***
(0.0146)
(0.0084)
(0.0081)
0.955***
0.0649***
0.430***
(0.0229)
(0.0141)
(0.0130)
0.0693**
0.0083***
0.0265***
(0.0345)
(0.0025)
(0.0019)
-0.0716
-0.0572
-0.0794**
(0.0586)
(0.0375)
(0.0345)
-0.1990***
0.0504
-0.0659*
(0.0627)
(0.0408)
(0.0371)
-0.1090***
-0.0531***
-0.0812***
(0.0295)
(0.0201)
(0.0179)
-0.0503***
-0.0780***
-0.0675***
(0.0065)
(0.0036)
(0.0035)
0.0364***
0.0025
0.0101***
(0.0036)
(0.0019)
(0.0019)
-0.0907***
-0.0991***
-0.0960***
(0.0008)
(0.0009)
(0.0006)
40,255
38,655
78,910
0.791
0.624
0.687
Y
Y
Y

Observations
R-squared
Fixed Effects (Firm, Year,
and Industry)
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Table 7 is Comp, which is financial statement
comparability, calculated as the within industry mean of earnings-returns co-movement for all firm pairs in an industry
as in De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011). Follower is set equal to 1 for a firm-year classified as industry follower
if its market share is lower than median of an industry based on three-digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. I separate two
subsamples partitioned median of weighted score of Ext_Invest. High score group includes observations Ext_Invest
scores above median, while low score group contains observations with scores below the median. In the interaction
term, group of low score of Ext_Invest_low equals to 1, otherwise 0. The low score group of Ext_Invest_low consists
of scores less than median. I include firm- and year-, and industry-fixed effects, respectively. See Appendix A for
detailed variable definitions.

47

CHAPTER 5
ROBUSTNESS CHECK
Alternative Measure of Proprietary Costs of Financial Reporting
In this empirical research, I use two proxies for proprietary costs of financial reporting. The first
is ADJ_SPEED, which is the speed of abnormal profits away from the industry mean (Harris 1998). The
second proxy is the dichotomous variable of Follower. It is categorized by market share in an industry. Li
(2010) suggests that competitive pressure is more pronounced for industry follower. Meanwhile, Imhof et
al. (2018) use Competitive Strategy – Prospector, and Defender. Miles and Snow (1978) suggest that there
are three types of sustainable firms: Prospectors, Defenders, and Analyzers. Defenders focus on production
efficiencies rather than on new product development. At the opposite end of the spectrum are Prospectors.
Prospectors operate across multiple product domains and are constantly finding and exploring new product
and market opportunities (Miles & Snow 1978). Prospectors generate the highest levels of proprietary
information and are most vulnerable to competition. However, the problem of this proxy is that the
Competitive Strategy (Prospector) is a firm-specific feature and different firm-specific features can bring
different financial reporting outcomes. Since this variable can be directly associated with financial
statement comparability, the Competitive Strategy (Prospector) variable may bias in favor of hypotheses.
In order to control for the effect of firm-specific advantages, I use other proxies - ADJ_SPEED and
Follower. For robustness check, I investigate whether my results are consistent with the outcomes with
proxy used in Imhof et al. (2018).
In Table 8, I report the results from empirical test using Prospector variable. Collectively, the
results support my previous findings that as proprietary costs increase, financial statement comparability
decreases. The coefficients on the proxy of Prospector are consistent with the coefficients on my previous
two proxies, strengthening my previous results. In addition, the coefficients in Table 8 support the previous
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results that as country-level financial reporting environment is weaker, the negative relation between
proprietary costs and comparability is more pronounced.
Table 8. Alternative proxy of proprietary costs proposed by Imhof et al. (2018)
VARIABLES

Prospector

Dependent Variable = Financial Statement Comparability (Comp)
Entire sample
High Score
Low Score
Interaction term
(country-level
(country-level
factors)
factors)
-0.0897***
(0.0251)

-0.0027***
(0.0005)

-0.0858***
(0.0042)

78,910
0.045

43,797
0.029

35,113
0.0841

-0.0897***
(0.0251)

0.0179***
(0.0043)

-0.240***
(0.0589)

78,910
0.045

51,290
0.021

27,620
0.121

-0.0896***
(0.0251)

0.0089***
(0.0023)

-0.188***
(0.0459)

78,910
0.045

39,881
0.033

39,029
0.073

-0.0896***
(0.0251)

0.0070***
(0.0027)

-0.173***
(0.0421)

78,910
0.045

38,655
0.029

40,255
0.090

Prospector× Corp_Env_low
Observations
R-squared
Prospector
Prospector× Inv_Prot _low
Observations
R-squared
Prospector
Prospector× Gov_Env_low
Observations
R-squared
Prospector
Prospector× Ext_Invest_low
Observations
R-squared

-0.0270***
(0.0039)
-0.0312***
(0.0051)
78,910
0.046
-0.0334***
(0.0043)
-0.0372***
(0.0053)
78,910
0.046
-0.0221***
(0.0037)
-0.0244***
(0.0050)
78,910
0.045
-0.0217***
(0.0037)
-0.0236***
(0.0050)
78,910
0.045

Fixed Effectss (Firm, Year,
Y
Y
Y
Y
and Industry)
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Table 8 is Comp, which is financial statement
comparability, calculated as the within industry mean of earnings-returns co-movement for all firm pairs in an industry
as in De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011). Prospector is coded 1 if firm strategy score is between 24 and 30, 0
otherwise. Bentley et al. (2013) compute strategy score with six firm-level measures on a rolling five-year average,
with each measure representing a different aspect of firm strategy. The six measures include research and development
expenses deflated by sales, the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses to sales, the annual percentage
change in sales, the number of employees to sales, property, plant, and equipment deflated by sales, and the standard
deviation of the number of employees. I separate two subsamples partitioned by median of weighted score of each
country-level factor(Corp_Env, Inv_Prot, Gov_Env, and Ext_Invest). High score group includes observations
country-level factor scores above median, while low score group contains observations with scores below the median.
In the interaction term, group of low score of Corp_Env_low, Inv_Prot_low, Gov_Env_low, Ext_Invest_low equals
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to 1, otherwise 0. The low score group of country-level factors consists of scores less than median. I include firm- and
year-, and industry-fixed effects, respectively. See APPENDIX for detailed variable definitions.

Cross-listed in the U.S.
Previous empirical research suggests that firms decide to cross-list in the U.S. capital market.
Cross-listing in the U.S. brings signal of firm’s commitment to protect shareholder interests and provide
higher quality disclosures. It builds on the advantages of the U.S. regulatory system with its superior
disclosure regime and greater scrutiny from regulators, market intermediaries, and investors (Stulz, 1999;
Coffee, 1999). Intermediaries, such as international audit firms, rating agencies, and underwriters, will put
more pressure on managers, thereby limiting their ability to expropriate resources though actions like
overinvestment, fraud, or strategic defaults. Overall, a credible commitment to more transparency and
market scrutiny stemming from cross-listing in the U.S. should facilitate access to capital markets (Hart,
1995; Ball et al., 2018). Thus, since I expect ADR (American Depository Receipts) firms to face higher
accounting quality from investors, I add ADR indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is cross-listed in the
U.S., using ADR data from BNY Mellon website (https://www.adrbnymellon.com/directory/dr-directory),
and 0 otherwise. In order to examine whether cross-listing in the U.S. capital market affects my empirical
results, I test for sub-samples of firms whose equity is not cross-listed in the US and of those whose equity
is.
In Table 9, I report the results from empirical test for sub-samples, which are non cross-listing
firms and cross-listing firms. In sum, the results support my previous findings that as proprietary costs
increase, financial statement comparability decreases. The coefficients of ADJ_SPEED and Follower are
consistent with the coefficients on my previous tests in table 3,4,5,6, and 7. In addition, the coefficients in
Table 9 show that the negative relation between proprietary costs and comparability is more pronounced in
non cross-listing firms. It indicates that firms that are cross listed in the U.S. capital market are more
monitored and are regulated to provide transparent financial reporting.
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Table 9. Firms cross-listed in the U.S. vs. Firms not cross-listed in the U.S.
Variables
Proprietary costs
ADJ_SPEED
Follower
Observations
R-squared (ADJ_SPEED)
R-squared (Follower)

ADJ_SPEED
Follower
Observations
R-squared (ADJ_SPEED)
R-squared (Follower)

ADJ_SPEED
Follower
Observations
R-squared (ADJ_SPEED)
R-squared (Follower)

ADJ_SPEED
Follower
Observations
R-squared (ADJ_SPEED)
R-squared (Follower)

ADJ_SPEED
Follower
Observations
R-squared (ADJ_SPEED)
R-squared (Follower)
Fixed Effectss (Firm, Year,
and Industry)

Dependent Variable = Financial Statement Comparability (Comp)
Strong FRE
Poor FRE
Non cross-listing
Cross-listing
Non cross-listing
Cross-listing
Robustness check in Table 3
-0.0260***
-0.0245***
-0.0985***
-0.0366***
(0.0094)
(0.0069)
(0.0172)
(0.0062)
-0.0022
-0.0018
-0.0019
-0.0020
(0.0003)
(0.0001)
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
20,925
7,168
41,378
9,469
0.3929
0.5628
0.6693
0.5367
0.4651
0.6003
0.5724
0.4759
Robustness check in Table 4
-0.0202***
-0.0174***
(0.0050)
(0.0071)
-0.0019***
-0.0014***
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
32,346
11,467
0.2316
0.3184
0.4236
0.3125

-0.1164***
(0.0175)
-0.0023***
(0.0001)
29,957
0.6434
0.5511

-0.0747***
(0.0083)
-0.0023***
(0.0003)
5,170
0.5378
0.4813

Robustness check in Table 5
-0.0362***
-0.0257***
(0.0050)
(0.0069)
-0.0021***
-0.0019***
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
38309
12,998
0.4829
0.4825
0.5701
0.5694

-0.1314***
(0.02135)
-0.0021***
(0.0004)
23,994
0.7589
0.7238

-0.0536***
(0.0087)
-0.0019***
(0.0001)
3,639
0.5460
0.5035

Robustness check in Table 6
-0.03706***
-0.0269***
(0.0055)
(0.0076)
-0.0017***
-0.0016***
(0.0001)
(0.0002)
30,314
9,591
0.5166
0.6006
0.5738
0.6337

-0.1300***
(0.0085)
-0.0028***
(0.0003)
31,989
0.6964
0.6104

-0.0769***
(0.0276)
-0.0022***
(0.0001)
7,046
0.5073
0.4396

Robustness check in Table 7
-0.0475***
-0.0382***
(0.0060)
(0.0086)
-0.0017***
-0.0013***
(0.0001)
(0.0002)
28,395
10,283
0.5333
0.5596
0.5670
0.5887

-0.1358*
(0.0074)
-0.0024***
(0.0002)
33,908
0.7868
0.7462

-0.0600***
(0.0231)
-0.0021***
(0.0001)
6,354
0.5264
0.4885

Y

Y

Y

Y
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Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. I add ADR indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is cross listed in the
U.S., using ADR data from BNY Mellon website (https://www.adrbnymellon.com/directory/dr-directory), and 0
otherwise. In order to examine whether cross-listing in the U.S. capital market affects my empirical results, I test again
for sub-samples of firms whose equity is not cross-listed in the US and of those whose equity is, from table 3 to table
7. I include firm- and year-, and industry-fixed effects, respectively.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, I investigate the effects of country-level attributes on the association between
proprietary costs of financial reporting and financial statement comparability. I document two important
findings in this paper. I find that the negative relationship between proprietary costs and comparability is
stronger in countries with poor financial reporting environments. In addition, I find that, among the countrylevel attributes, Investor Protection has the largest impact on the relationship between proprietary costs
and comparability. This international study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it extends the
findings conducted by Imhof et al. (2018) on U.S. firms to an international setting. This highlights the
differential effects played by proprietary costs of financial reporting on accounting comparability across
countries with different financial reporting environments. Second, this international study demonstrates the
different impact of various country-level attributes, which are four latent factors (Corporate Environment,
Investor Protection, Governance Environment, External Investors) proposed by Isidro et al. (2019), on
the relationship between proprietary costs and comparability. Specifically, since the differential impact of
each of the four factors is not observable in a within-country study, the international setting enables me to
examine how variation in the four factors across countries affect the relationship between proprietary costs
of financial reporting and financial statement comparability. This study may provide implications for policy
makers in countries with poor financial reporting environments that they should emphasize strong
protection of investor rights and attempt to develop capital markets in order to enhance firms’ financial
reporting quality. Further, the results might be useful for stakeholders, or investors, in analyzing firms’
financial statements, especially in countries with poor financial reporting environments.

53

REFERENCES
Abdi, M., & Aulakh, P. S. 2012. Do country-level institutional frameworks and interfirm governance
arrangements substitute or complement in international business relationships?: Journal of
International Business Studies, 43(5), 477-497.
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M., & Matos, P. 2011. Does governance travel around the world? Evidence
from institutional investors: Journal of Financial Economics, 100(1), 154-181.
Ali, A., Klasa, S., & Yeung, E. 2014. Industry concentration and corporate disclosure policy: Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 58(2-3), 240-264.
Bagnoli, M., & Watts, S. G. 2005. Conservative accounting choices: Management Science, 51(5), 786-801.
Bagnoli, M., & Watts, S. G. 2010. Oligopoly, disclosure, and earnings management: The Accounting
Review, 85(4), 1191-1214.
Balakrishnan, K., & Cohen, D. A. 2013. Competition and financial accounting misreporting: Available at
SSRN 1927427.
Ball, R. T., Hail, L., & Vasvari, F. P. 2018. Equity cross-listings in the US and the price of debt. Review of
Accounting Studies, 23(2), 385-421.
Ball, R., Robin, A., & Wu, J. S. 2003. Incentives versus standards: properties of accounting income in four
East Asian countries: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1-3), 235-270.
Ball, R., Kothari, S. P., & Robin, A. 2000. The effect of international institutional factors on properties of
accounting earnings: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29(1), 1-51.
Barth, M. E. 2013. Global comparability in financial reporting: What, why, how, and when?: China Journal
of Accounting Studies, 1(1), 2-12.
54

Bascle, G. 2008. Controlling for endogeneity with instrumental variables in strategic management research:
Strategic Organization, 6(3), 285-327.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and
financial statement fraud: Accounting Review, 443-465.
Behn, B. K., Gotti, G., Herrmann, D., & Kang, T. 2013. Classification shifting in an international setting:
Investor protection and financial analysts monitoring: Journal of International Accounting Research,
12(2), 27-50.
Bentley, K. A., Omer, T. C., & Sharp, N. Y. 2013. Business strategy, financial reporting irregularities, and
audit effort: Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(2), 780-817.
Bushman, R. M., Piotroski, J. D., & Smith, A. J. 2004. What determines corporate transparency?: Journal
of Accounting Research, 42(2), 207-252.
Cascino, S., & Gassen, J. 2015. What drives the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption?: Review
of Accounting Studies, 20(1), 242-282.
Chen, C. X., Matsumura, E. M., Shin, J. Y., & Wu, S. Y. C. 2014. The effect of competition intensity and
competition type on the use of customer satisfaction measures in executive annual bonus contracts:
The Accounting Review, 90(1), 229-263.
Choi, J. H., Choi, S., Myers, L. A., & Ziebart, D. 2019. Financial statement comparability and the
informativeness of stock prices about future earnings: Contemporary Accounting Research, 36(1),
389-417.
Clinch, G., & Verrecchia, R. E. 1997. Competitive disadvantage and discretionary disclosure in industries:
Australian Journal of Management, 22(2), 125-137.

55

Coffee, J. 1999. The future as history: The prospects for global convergence in corporate governance and
its implications. Northwestern University Law Review, 93, 641–707.
Dhaliwal, D., Huang, S., Khurana, I. K., & Pereira, R. 2014. Product market competition and conditional
conservatism: Review of Accounting Studies, 19(4), 1309-1345.
Darrough, M.N. and Stoughton, N.M. 1990. Financial disclosure policy in an entry game: Journal of
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 12 Nos 1-3, pp. 219-243.
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation:
An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC: Contemporary Accounting Research,
13(1), 1-36.
Deephouse, D. L., Newburry, W., & Soleimani, A. 2016. The effects of institutional development and
national culture on cross-national differences in corporate reputation: Journal of World Business, 51(3),
463-473.
De Franco, G., Kothari, S. P., & Verdi, R. S. 2011. The benefits of financial statement comparability:
Journal of Accounting Research, 49(4), 895-931.
DeFond, M., Hung, M., & Trezevant, R. 2007. Investor protection and the information content of annual
earnings announcements: International evidence: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43(1), 37-67.
Degeorge, F., Ding, Y., Jeanjean, T., & Stolowy, H. 2013. Analyst coverage, earnings management and
financial development: An international study: Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 32(1), 1-25.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 2008. The law and economics of self-dealing:
Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3), 430-465.
Doupnik, T. S., & Tsakumis, G. T. 2004. A critical review of tests of Gray's theory of cultural relevance
and suggestions for future research: Journal of Accounting Literature, 23, 1.
56

Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 1980. Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting
Information. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2. Norwalk, CT: FASB.
Financial Accounting Standards Board. 2010. Statement of financial accounting concepts Number 8:
Conceptual framework for financial reporting. Norwalk, CT: Author.
Financial Accounting Standards Board. 2013. International convergence of accounting standards - An
overview: Retrieved from http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176156306962
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. A. 2009. Strategic leadership: Theory and research on
executives, top management teams, and boards: Oxford University Press, USA.
Francis, J. R., Pinnuck, M. L., & Watanabe, O. 2013. Auditor style and financial statement comparability:
The Accounting Review, 89(2), 605-633.
Gray, S. J., & Vint, H. M. 1995. The impact of culture on accounting disclosures: some international
evidence: Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting, 2(1), 33-43.
Han, S., Kang, T., Salter, S., & Yoo, Y. K. 2010. A cross-country study on the effects of national culture
on earnings management: Journal of International Business Studies, 41(1), 123-141.
Harris, M. S. 1998. The association between competition and managers' business segment reporting
decisions: Journal of Accounting Research, 36(1), 111-128.
Hart, O. D. 1983. The market mechanism as an incentive scheme: The Bell Journal of Economics, 366-382.
Hart, O. 1995. Firms, contracts, and financial structure. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hope, O. K. 2003. Disclosure practices, enforcement of accounting standards, and analysts' forecast
accuracy: An international study: Journal of Accounting Research, 41(2), 235-272.

57

Hofstede, G. 1980. Culture and organizations: International Studies of Management & Organization, 10(4),
15-41.
IASB. 2010. The Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting 2010: IASB.
Imhof, M. J., Seavey, S. E., & Smith, D. B. 2017. Comparability and cost of equity capital: Accounting
Horizons, 31(2), 125-138.
Imhof, M. J., Seavey, S. E., & Watanabe, O. V. 2018. Competition, Proprietary Costs of Financial Reporting,
and Financial Statement Comparability: Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance,
0148558X18814599.
Isidro, H., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. 2019. On the Relation between Financial Reporting Quality and
Country Attributes: Research Challenges and Opportunities: The Accounting Review
Harris, M. S. 1998. The association between competition and managers' business segment reporting
decisions: Journal of Accounting Research, 36(1), 111-128.
Haw, I. M., Hu, B., Lee, J. J., & Wu, W. 2012. Investor protection and price informativeness about future
earnings: international evidence: Review of Accounting Studies, 17(2), 389-419.
Haw, I. M. G., Ho, S. S., Li, Y., & Zhang, F. 2015. Product market competition, legal institutions, and
accounting conservatism: Journal of International Accounting Research, 14(2), 1-39.
Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. 2004. Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda:
Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 725-740.
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems:
Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880.
Judge, W. Q., Douglas, T. J., & Kutan, A. M. 2008. Institutional antecedents of corporate governance
legitimacy: Journal of Management, 34(4), 765-785.
58

Karuna, C. 2007. Industry product market competition and managerial incentives: Journal of Accounting
and Economics, 43(2-3), 275-297.
Karuna, C., Subramanyam, K. R., & Tian, F. 2012. Industry product market competition and earnings
management: In American Accounting Association Financial Accounting and Reporting Section MidYear Conference.
Kim, S., Kraft, P., & Ryan, S. G. 2013. Financial statement comparability and credit risk: Review of
Accounting Studies, 18(3), 783-823.
Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J., & Wasley, C. E. 2005. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures:
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(1), 163-197.
Krishnan, J. 2001. Corporate governance and internal control: An empirical analysis: In American
accounting association annual meeting. Atlanta, Georgia.
Laksmana, I., & Yang, Y. W. 2014. Product market competition and earnings management: Evidence from
discretionary accruals and real activity manipulation: Advances in Accounting, 30(2), 263-275.
Lang, M. H., Maffett, M. G., & Owens, E. 2010. Earnings comovement and accounting comparability: The
effects of mandatory IFRS adoption.
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1997. Legal determinants of external
finance: The Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131-1150.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1998. Law and finance: Journal of Political
Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155.
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 2006. What works in securities laws?: The Journal of
Finance, 61(1), 1-32.

59

Larcker, D. F., & Rusticus, T. O. 2010. On the use of instrumental variables in accounting research: Journal
of Accounting and Economics, 49(3), 186-205.
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. 2003. Earnings management and investor protection: an
international comparison: Journal of Financial Economics, 69(3), 505-527.
Li, X. 2010. The impacts of product market competition on the quantity and quality of voluntary disclosures:
Review of Accounting Studies, 15(3), 663-711.
Malagueño, R., Albrecht, C., Ainge, C., & Stephens, N. 2010. Accounting and corruption: a cross-country
analysis: Journal of Money Laundering Control, 13(4), 372-393.
Marciukaityte, D. and Park, J.C. 2009. Market competition and earnings management: SSRN Working
Paper No. 1361905, March.
Neel, M. 2017. Accounting comparability and economic outcomes of mandatory IFRS adoption:
Contemporary Accounting Research, 34(1), 658-690.
Nickell, S. J. 1996. Competition and corporate performance: Journal of Political Economy, 104(4), 724746.
North, D. 1997. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Moscow: Fond
ekonomicheskikh knig “Nachala”(in Russian).
Raith, M. 2003. Competition, risk, and managerial incentives: American Economic Review, 93(4), 14251436.
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. 2003. The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth
century: Journal of financial economics, 69(1), 5-50.
Salter, S. B. 1998. Corporate financial disclosure in emerging markets: does economic development matter?:
The International Journal of Accounting, 33(2), 211-234.
60

Shane, P. B., Smith, D. B., & Zhang, S. 2014. Financial statement comparability and valuation of seasoned
equity offerings: Available at SSRN 2372965.
Sherman, H. D., & Young, S. D. 2016. Where financial reporting still falls short: Harvard Business Review,
94(7), 17.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1997. A survey of corporate governance: The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737783.
Stulz, R. 1999. Globalization, corporate finance, and the cost of capital. Journal of Applied Corporate
Finance, 12, 8–25.
Stulz, R. M., & Williamson, R. 2003. Culture, openness, and finance: Journal of Financial Economics,
70(3), 313-349.
Peress, J. 2010. Product market competition, insider trading, and stock market efficiency: The Journal of
Finance, 65(1), 1-43.
Porter, M. E, 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York: Free Press
Verrecchia, R. E. 1983. Discretionary disclosure: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5, 179-194.
Verrecchia, R. E., & Weber, J. 2006. Redacted disclosure: Journal of Accounting Research, 44(4), 791-814.
Wagenhofer, A. 1990. Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent: Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 12(4), 341-363.
Wolfolds, S. E., & Siegel, J. 2019. Misaccounting for endogeneity: The peril of relying on the Heckman
two‐step method without a valid instrument: Strategic Management Journal, 40(3), 432-462.

61

APPENDIX
Variable Definitions
Accrual Quality

Absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the Jones (1991)
model, as modified by Kothari et al. (2005).

ADJ_SPEED

An estimate of the speed of abnormal profit adjustment in the firm’s threedigit industry. Harris (1998) measures the speed with which abnormal
profits adjust to the industry mean. Specifically, she estimates:
X 𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑘 (𝐷𝑛 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽2𝑗𝑘 (𝐷𝑝 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 ) + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡
,where X 𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 is the difference between firm i’s return on assets and the mean
return on assets for its industry j (three-digit SIC code) and country k, in
year t; 𝐷𝑛 =1 if 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 is less than or equal to zero, and 0 otherwise; and
𝐷𝑝 =1 if 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1 is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient 𝜷𝟐𝒋𝒌
captures the persistence of abnormally high ROA in industry j, where a low
value of 𝜷𝟐𝒋𝒌 is assumed to indicate intense competition.

ADR

ADR indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is cross listed in the U.S.,
using

ADR

data

from

BNY

Mellon

website

(https://www.adrbnymellon.com/directory/dr-directory), and 0 otherwise.
Corp_Env

Standardized scores of country factor one in Isidro et al. (2019). It is
associated with good institutional and governance systems, and economic
and social welfare. The high score of Corp_Env indicates better Corporate
Environment.

Comp

I compute the accounting comparability between firm i and firm j as the
negative value of the average absolute difference between the predicted
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earnings using firm i’s and firm j’s accounting functions. I require that firm
i and j be in the same three-digit SIC code, share the same fiscal year-end
date, and be from same country. I measure comparability Comp, which is
the median of all comparability scores of firm i in period t in the same
industry, as in De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011).
Gov_Env

Standardized scores of country factor three in Isidro et al. (2019) It is
associated with political transparency, and tax and accounting enforcement.
The high score of Gov_Env indicates better corporate governance.

Ext_Invest

Standardized scores of country factor four in Isidro et al. (2019). The high
score of Ext_Invest captures openness of society to external investment.

Follower

Set equal to 1 for a firm-year classified as industry follower if its market
share is lower than median of an industry based on three-digit SIC code and
0 otherwise

Inv_Prot

Standardized scores of country factor two in Isidro et al. (2019). It is
associated with strong protection of investors’ rights and capital markets
development. The high score of Inv_Prot indicates better investor
protection.

LEV

Leverage is the total debt deflated by the average total assets.

MTB

Market value of equity divided by book value of equity.

Operating Cash Flow

Operating cash flow, deflated by beginning of period prices. These data are
drawn from COMPUSTAT Global files.

Prospector

Bentley et al. (2013) compute this proxy based on a rolling five-year
average of six firm-level measures, each measure representing a different
aspect of firm strategy. These include research and development expenses
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deflated by sales, the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses
to sales, the annual percentage change in sales, the number of employees to
sales, property, plant, and equipment deflated by sales, and the standard
deviation of the number of employees. Each five-year average is then
ranked into quintiles by 2-digit SIC industry-year, and I assigned a score of
5 if the value falls in the highest quintile, 4 in the second-highest quintile,
3 in the middle quintile, 2 in the second-lowest quintile and 1 in the lowest
quintile. Individual scores are summed across the six variables by year, so
that each firm receives a total score between 6 and 30. Firms with total
scores between 6-12 are considered Defenders, between 13-23, Analyzers,
and between 24-30, Prospectors.
Size

Firm size is the natural logarithm of the total assets (in millions of U.S.
dollars) at the end of fiscal year t.

Std_cashflow

Standard deviation in quarterly cash flows from operations, scaled by total
assets for preceding four years.

Std_sale

Standard deviation of preceding four years’ sales, scaled by total assets.

Std_sale growth

Standard deviation of growth in quarterly sales for preceding four years.

Stock return

12-month stock return for the current fiscal year.
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